0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/solidity-audit
Claude Code and agent skill by 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit
- community
Checking that the SKILL.md file is still in the repository.
Security audit and code review checklist. Covers 30+ vulnerability types with real-world exploit cases (2021-2026) and EVMbench Code4rena patterns. Use when conducting security audits, code reviews, or pre-deployment security assessments.
Install
npx vskill@latest install 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/solidity-auditSKILL.md
Solidity Security Audit Checklist
Language Rule
- Always respond in the same language the user is using. If the user asks in Chinese, respond in Chinese. If in English, respond in English.
Usage: This skill is for security audits and code reviews. It is NOT auto-invoked — call/solidity-auditwhen reviewing contracts for vulnerabilities.
Contract-Level Vulnerabilities
1. Reentrancy
| Variant | Description | Check | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Same-function | Attacker re-enters the same function via fallback/receive | All external calls after state updates (CEI pattern)? | |
| Cross-function | Attacker re-enters a different function sharing state | All functions touching shared state protected by nonReentrant? | |
| Cross-contract | Attacker re-enters through a different contract that reads stale state | External contracts cannot read intermediate state? | |
| Read-only | View function returns stale data during mid-execution state | No critical view functions used as oracle during state transitions? |
Case: GMX v1 (Jul 2025, $42M) — reentrancy in GLP pool on Arbitrum, attacker looped withdrawals to drain liquidity.
2. Access Control
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
| Missing modifier | Every state-changing function has explicit access control? | |
| Modifier logic | Modifier actually reverts on failure (not just empty check)? | |
| State flag | Access-once patterns properly update storage after each user? | |
| Admin privilege scope | Owner powers are minimal and time-limited? |
Case: Bybit (Feb 2025, $1.4B) — Safe{Wallet} UI injected with malicious JS, hijacked signing process. Not a contract flaw, but access control at the infrastructure layer.
3. Input Validation
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
| Zero address | All address params reject address(0)? | |
| Zero amount | Fund transfers reject zero amounts? | |
| Array bounds | Paired arrays validated for matching length? | |
| Arbitrary call | No unvalidated address.call(data) where attacker controls data? | |
| Numeric bounds | Inputs bounded to prevent dust attacks or gas griefing? |
4. Flash Loan Attacks
| Variant | Mechanism | Defense | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Price manipulation | Flash-borrow → swap to move price → exploit price-dependent logic → repay | TWAP oracle with min-liquidity check | |
| Governance | Flash-borrow governance tokens → vote → repay in same block | Snapshot voting + minimum holding period + timelock ≥ 48h | |
| Liquidation | Flash-borrow → manipulate collateral value → trigger liquidation | Multi-oracle price verification + circuit breaker | |
| Combo (rounding) | Flash-borrow → manipulate pool → micro-withdrawals exploit rounding → repay | Minimum withdrawal amount + virtual shares |
Cases:
- Cream Finance (Oct 2021, $130M) — flash loan + yUSD oracle manipulation + missing reentrancy guard
- Abracadabra (Mar 2025, $13M) — state tracking error in cauldron, self-liquidation + bad loan
- Bunni (Sep 2025, $8.4M) — flash loan + pool price manipulation + rounding error micro-withdrawals
5. Oracle & Price
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
| Single oracle dependency | Using multiple independent price sources? | |
| Stale price | Checking updatedAt timestamp and rejecting old data? | |
| Spot price usage | Never using raw AMM reserves for pricing? | |
| Minimum liquidity | Oracle reverts if pool reserves below threshold? | |
| Price deviation | Circuit breaker if price moves beyond threshold vs last known? | |
| Chainlink round completeness | Checking answeredInRound >= roundId? |
Case: Cream Finance (Oct 2021, $130M) — attacker manipulated yUSD vault price by reducing supply, then used inflated collateral to drain all lending pools.
6. Numerical Issues
| Type | Description | Defense | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primitive overflow | uint256 a = uint8(b) + 1 — reverts if b=255 on Solidity ≥0.8 | Use consistent types, avoid implicit narrowing | |
| Truncation | int8(int256Value) — silently overflows even on ≥0.8 | Use SafeCast library for all type narrowing | |
| Rounding / precision loss | usdcAmount / 1e12 always rounds to 0 for small amounts | Multiply before divide; check for zero result | |
| Division before multiplication | (a / b) * c loses precision | Always (a * c) / b |
Case: Bunni (Sep 2025, $8.4M) — rounding errors in micro-withdrawals exploited via flash loan.
7. Signature Issues
| Type | Description | Defense | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ecrecover returns address(0) | Invalid sig returns address(0), not revert | Always check recovered != address(0) | |
| Replay attack | Same signature reused across txs/chains | Include chainId + nonce + deadline in signed data | |
| Signature malleability | ECDSA has two valid (s, v) pairs per signature | Use OpenZeppelin ECDSA.recover (enforces low-s) | |
| Empty loop bypass | Signature verification in for-loop, attacker sends empty array | Check signatures.length >= requiredCount before loop | |
| Missing msg.sender binding | Proof/signature not bound to caller | Always include msg.sender in signed/proven data |
8. ERC20 Compatibility
| Issue | Description | Defense | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fee-on-transfer | transfer(100) may deliver <100 tokens | Check balance before/after, use actual received amount | |
| Rebase tokens | Token balances change without transfers | Never cache external balances; always read live | |
| No bool return | Some tokens (USDT) don't return bool on transfer | Use SafeERC20.safeTransfer | |
| ERC777 hooks | Transfer hooks can trigger reentrancy | Use ReentrancyGuard on all token-receiving functions | |
| Zero-amount transfer | transferFrom(A, B, 0) — address poisoning | Reject zero-amount transfers | |
| Approval race | Changing allowance from N to M allows spending N+M | Use safeIncreaseAllowance / safeDecreaseAllowance |
9. MEV / Front-Running
| Type | Description | Defense | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sandwich attack | Attacker front-runs buy + back-runs sell around victim | Slippage protection + deadline parameter | |
| ERC4626 inflation | First depositor donates to inflate share price, rounding out later depositors | Minimum first deposit or virtual shares (ERC4626 with offset) | |
| Approval front-run | Attacker spends old allowance before new allowance tx confirms | Use increaseAllowance not approve | |
| Unrestricted withdrawal | Attacker monitors mempool for withdraw tx, front-runs with own | Require commit-reveal or auth binding |
10. Storage & Low-Level
| Issue | Description | |
|---|---|---|
| Storage pointer | Foo storage foo = arr[0]; foo = arr[1]; — does NOT update arr[0] | |
| Nested delete | delete structWithMapping — inner mapping data persists | |
| Private variables | All contract storage is publicly readable via eth_getStorageAt | |
| Unsafe delegatecall | Delegatecall to untrusted contract can selfdestruct the caller | |
| Proxy storage collision | Upgrade changes parent order → variables overwrite each other (use storage gaps) | |
| msg.value in loop | msg.value doesn't decrease in loop — enables double-spend |
11. Contract Detection Bypass
| Method | How it works | |
|---|---|---|
| Constructor call | Attack from constructor — extcodesize == 0 during deployment | |
| CREATE2 pre-compute | Pre-calculate contract address, use as EOA before deploying |
12. Proxy & Upgrade Vulnerabilities
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
_authorizeUpgrade access control | UUPS _authorizeUpgrade must have onlyOwner modifier? | |
| Permissionless factory/registry | Can attacker use permissionless factory (e.g. Aquifer boreWell) to satisfy upgrade checks? | |
upgradeTo modifier | Overridden upgradeTo/upgradeToAndCall retains onlyProxy modifier? | |
| Initializer protection | initializer modifier prevents re-initialization? Implementation calls _disableInitializers()? | |
| Storage layout compatibility | Upgrade-safe storage layout (storage gaps or ERC-7201 namespace)? |
Case: Code4rena 2024-07-basin H-01 (via EVMbench Paper Fig.12, p.19) — _authorizeUpgrade only checked delegatecall and Aquifer registration but lacked onlyOwner, allowing anyone to upgrade a Well proxy to a malicious implementation and drain funds. Oracle patch: add a single onlyOwner modifier.
13. Trust Boundary & Protocol Composability
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-vault trust isolation | Registry/Router relay calls verify vault-level authorization? | |
| Trusted sender abuse | Functions like sendTokensToTrustedAddress verify source vault, not just router identity? | |
| Flash loan + routing combo | Can attacker use flash loan callback to make router impersonate arbitrary vault? | |
| Collateral ownership verification | Liquidation/staking operations verify actual NFT/collateral owner? | |
| Cross-contract state dependency | Multi-contract interactions free from intermediate state dependencies? |
Cases:
- Code4rena 2024-04-noya H-08 (via EVMbench Paper §4.2.1, Fig.6, p.8-9) — PositionRegistry + BalancerFlashLoan pipeline lacked vault-level auth; keeper used flash loan to make router impersonate any vault, draining cross-vault funds via
sendTokensToTrustedAddress - Code4rena 2024-07-benddao (via EVMbench Paper Fig.13, p.19) —
isolateLiquidatedid not verify NFT ownership, allowing attacker to pass others' tokenIds for liquidation
14. State Ordering & Counter Manipulation
| Check | Detail | |
|---|---|---|
| Counter/ID increment order | credIdCounter++ or similar ID increments happen before external calls? | |
| Auto-buy in create | create() functions with auto buy() calls execute only after ID/state fully initialized? | |
| Refund timing | ETH refund (excess) happens after all state updates complete? | |
| Bonding curve metadata overwrite | Can attacker reenter to modify bonding curve/pricing params — buy cheap, switch to expensive curve, sell high? |
Case: Code4rena 2024-08-phi H-06 (via EVMbench Paper Appendix H.1, p.25-28) — _createCredInternal called buyShareCred before incrementing credIdCounter; _handleTrade refunded excess ETH before updating lastTradeTimestamp. Attacker reentered to accumulate shares on cheap curve, overwrote metadata to expensive curve, sold to drain all contract ETH. Fix: add nonReentrant to buyShareCred/sellShareCred.
15. Per-Address State Bypass
Any restriction based onmapping(address => ...)can be circumvented by multi-address splitting or intermediate transfer.
This is the start of the file. Read the full SKILL.md on GitHub.
Security
- Security scanPassed, 100 of 100Pattern checks on the skill's files.
- Model reviewPassed
Quality evaluation
- Task evaluationNot runNo evaluation yet. Run one in Skill Studio.
Source
- SKILL.md in the repositoryCheckingskills/solidity-audit/SKILL.md
Popularity
- Repository stars
- 2
- Repository forks
- 1
- 7-day trend score
- 5
Stars and forks are for the whole GitHub repository, not this skill alone. Refreshed 9 May 2026, 6 months ago.
Works with
Any agent vskill installs to: 56 targets in all. These 39 have a page on this site.
- Claude Code
- Cursor
- GitHub Copilot
- Windsurf
- Codex
- Gemini CLI
- Cline
- Amp
- Roo Code
- Goose
- Continue
- Kilo Code
- Junie
- Trae
- OpenHands
- Qwen Code
- AI Agent
- Tabnine Chat
- Sourcegraph Cody
- Amazon Q
- Firebase Genkit
- Sweep
- Devin
- Phind
- Mentat
- Claude Desktop
- Aider
- GPT Pilot
- Plandex
- bolt.new
- v0
- Replit Agent
- Anse
- TypingMind
- BetterChatGPT
- LibreChat
- Warp AI
- Pieces
- Fig AI
Embed badge
[](https://verified-skill.com/skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/solidity-audit)