ahtishamshahzad/agent_dev_flow/api-security

API Security

Purpose

Assess the API's exposed surface against the ways APIs actually get breached — the OWASP API Security Top-10 shape: broken object/function-level authorization, injection, mass assignment, unrestricted resource consumption, and information leakage — and drive fixes proven by tests.

When to Use

• Reviewing a REST/GraphQL API for security, in ../../security-review.
• Not for building the API (backend pack) or browser-specific concerns (web-security) — though they overlap.

Inputs

• The API design/implementation + endpoint inventory (../../backend/rest-api-design, ../../backend/graphql-api-design).
• Authorization and validation designs (authorization-security, ../../backend/backend-validation).

Discovery Questions

• Is every input validated server-side (body, params, query, headers, uploads) and are queries parameterized (no injection)?
• Is object- and function-level authorization enforced per endpoint (→ authorization-security owns the depth)?
• Can clients set fields they shouldn't (mass assignment) or exhaust resources (no pagination/limits/depth caps)?
• Do errors leak internals (stack traces, SQL, existence)?

Responsibilities

• Injection + validation: confirm server-side schema validation at every entry point (../../backend/backend-validation) and parameterized data access (database-security); reject unknown fields.
• Authorization (delegate depth to authorization-security): confirm object-level (IDOR/BOLA) and function-level checks exist per endpoint and across resolvers/jobs.
• Mass assignment: clients can't set privileged fields (role, ownerId, isAdmin) via whitelisted-input gaps — validation strips unknown fields; sensitive fields set server-side only.
• Resource consumption: pagination enforced, body-size/array limits, GraphQL depth/cost limits, rate limits on expensive/public endpoints (abuse-prevention, ../../backend/rate-limiting) — unrestricted consumption is a DoS + cost attack.
• Information leakage: errors return safe shapes (../../backend/backend-error-handling) — no stack traces, SQL, internal IDs, or existence oracles; verbose debug off in production.
• Transport + headers: TLS, correct CORS (no wildcard-with-credentials), security headers (web-security for browser-facing).
• Route findings to fixes + security regression tests (security-regression-testing).

Required Workflow

1. Enumerate endpoints + their inputs and auth requirements.
2. Check validation/injection and (via authorization-security) object/function-level access.
3. Check mass-assignment and resource-consumption controls.
4. Check error/information leakage + transport/CORS/headers.
5. Record findings (Confirmed/Potential); route to fixes + regression tests.

Decision Rules

• Broken object-level authorization and injection are the highest-impact API findings — verify them first.
• Unknown-field stripping is the mass-assignment defense; "the client won't send that" is not.
• Every collection/expensive endpoint needs limits — unbounded is a finding.
• Errors reveal nothing internal — a stack trace in a response is a confirmed finding.

Rules

• Findings separated Confirmed vs Potential; never declare the API "secure" (../../security-review).
• Each finding maps to a fix + a negative/regression test.
• Depth of authorization review delegated to authorization-security; don't duplicate.

Anti-Patterns

• Reviewing validation but skipping object-level authorization (IDOR).
• Trusting client input for privileged fields.
• Endpoints with no pagination/size/depth limits.
• Stack traces / SQL / existence leaks in error responses.
• cors({ origin: true, credentials: true }).

Validation Checklist

• [ ] Server-side validation + parameterized access at every entry point.
• [ ] Object + function-level authorization verified (via authorization-security).
• [ ] Mass assignment blocked (unknown fields stripped; sensitive fields server-set).
• [ ] Resource-consumption limits (pagination, size, depth, rate).
• [ ] No information leakage in errors; TLS/CORS/headers correct.
• [ ] Findings → fixes → regression tests.

Definition of Done

A recorded API security assessment across the OWASP API risk shape — validation/injection, object/function-level authorization, mass assignment, resource consumption, information leakage, transport — with Confirmed/Potential findings routed to fixes and regression tests, and no "secure" claim.

Related Skills

authorization-security, ../../backend/backend-validation, ../../backend/backend-error-handling, ../../backend/rate-limiting, abuse-prevention, web-security, database-security, security-regression-testing, ../../security-review, threat-modeling.

Related Knowledge

../../../knowledge/ (endpoint inventory, API threats).

Related References

../../../references/security/ (API review checklists, when populated).

Context Loading Guidance

• Requires: API design/impl, endpoint inventory, validation/authz designs.
• Does not require: unrelated app internals, browser-only concerns beyond headers/CORS.
• May load: authorization-security, abuse-prevention.
• Stop when: findings + routed fixes/tests are recorded.

Token Efficiency Guidance

The endpoint × risk-category matrix is the artifact; delegate authorization depth to authorization-security rather than re-deriving it.