ahtishamshahzad/agent_dev_flow/database-security

Database Security (Security Review Lens)

Purpose

Verify the data store's security posture actually holds against attack: least-privilege access, no network exposure, an injection-free data layer, encryption of sensitive data, real tenant isolation, and disciplined PII handling. The build-side design is ../../database/database-security; this security-pack skill is the review/audit lens on it, feeding ../../security-review.

When to Use

• Auditing database security, in ../../security-review or threat-modeling data-disclosure threats.
• Not for designing the data-layer hardening (../../database/database-security) — this verifies it.

Inputs

• The database security design/implementation (../../database/database-security).
• Data-sensitivity map, tenancy model, deployment topology.

Discovery Questions

• What privileges does the app's runtime account actually hold — CRUD-only, or DDL/superuser it doesn't need?
• Is the database network-reachable from anywhere beyond the app (public listener, exposed port)?
• Is the data layer parameterized-only, or are there raw/string-built queries (incl. Mongo operator injection)?
• What sensitive data exists, is it encrypted appropriately, and does account deletion truly remove PII?

Responsibilities

• Least privilege: confirm the runtime account is CRUD-scoped (no DDL/superuser); migrations use a separate account; human/analytics access is limited and audited (../../database/database-security).
• Network exposure: confirm private-network-only, TLS-enforced, no public listener — an internet-reachable database is a critical finding.
• Injection surface: audit for parameterized-only access; flag string-built SQL and unvalidated object/operator injection in NoSQL (../../backend/backend-validation blocks {$gt:''}-shaped input); overlaps with api-security.
• Encryption: sensitive data encrypted at rest, TLS in transit, and application-level field encryption for the truly sensitive (tokens, stored user secrets) with key management (secrets-audit).
• Tenant isolation depth: confirm scoped queries are enforced (authorization-security, ../../backend/ownership-authorization) and evaluate whether the risk profile warrants DB-enforced isolation (row-level security / per-tenant schemas).
• PII discipline: no PII in logs/backups/dev seeds (privacy-review, ../../testing/test-data-management); retention + tested deletion paths exist.
• Route findings to fixes + regression tests (security-regression-testing).

Required Workflow

1. Review account privileges (runtime, migration, human, analytics).
2. Verify network isolation + TLS.
3. Audit the data layer for injection (SQL + NoSQL operator).
4. Verify encryption per data class + key management.
5. Assess tenant-isolation depth + PII handling/deletion.
6. Record findings; route to fixes + regression tests.

Decision Rules

• Public-reachable database or app-account-with-DDL/superuser = confirmed high-severity findings.
• Any string-built query is an injection finding regardless of "trusted" input.
• Field-level encryption is for data whose leak survives a full dump — verify it's applied where the sensitivity demands, not encrypt-everything-into-mush.
• Real production data in any lower environment is a finding (privacy-review).

Rules

• Never print secrets or real data during the audit — location + severity only.
• Findings separated Confirmed vs Potential; never declare "secure" (../../security-review).
• Each finding maps to a fix + regression test; delegate build-side design to ../../database/database-security.

Anti-Patterns

• Passing a database on a public IP.
• App connecting as owner/superuser "temporarily forever."
• The one legacy raw query nobody re-checks for injection.
• "Encrypted at rest" (disk) presented as answering field-sensitivity.
• PII in logs, backups, and dev seeds; deletion that flips a boolean.

Validation Checklist

• [ ] Least-privilege accounts verified (runtime/migration/human/analytics).
• [ ] Network private + TLS; no public listener.
• [ ] Parameterized-only data layer (SQL + NoSQL) verified.
• [ ] Encryption per class + key management confirmed.
• [ ] Tenant-isolation depth assessed; PII handling/deletion verified.
• [ ] Findings → fixes → regression tests.

Definition of Done

A recorded database security audit — access privileges, network exposure, injection surface, encryption, tenant isolation, PII handling — with Confirmed/Potential findings routed to fixes and regression tests, delegating build-side design to the database pack, and no "secure" claim.

Related Skills

../../database/database-security, authorization-security, ../../backend/ownership-authorization, api-security, secrets-audit, privacy-review, ../../testing/test-data-management, security-regression-testing, ../../security-review, threat-modeling.

Related Knowledge

../../../knowledge/ (data classes, tenancy model, topology).

Related References

../../../references/security/ (database review checklists, when populated).

Context Loading Guidance

• Requires: the database security design/impl, sensitivity map, topology.
• Does not require: re-designing the hardening (delegate), app feature code.
• May load: ../../database/database-security, authorization-security.
• Stop when: findings + routed fixes/tests are recorded.

Token Efficiency Guidance

The finding table (area → issue → severity → fix) is the artifact; never echo real data or secrets. Delegate build design rather than restating it.