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version: "1.0.0" name: aa description: ERC-4337 v0.7 account-abstraction foundation. Custody-free utilities for computing userOpHashes, packing UserOperations into the EntryPoint wire format, and proxying bundler-RPC calls (Pimlico / Alchemy / Stackup). Triggers: ERC-4337, account abstraction, smart contract wallet, userop, user operation, bundler, paymaster, session key, EntryPoint, AA wallet, smart wallet, gas sponsorship.


ERC-4337 (Account Abstraction) skill

This skill exposes the shared primitives every ERC-4337 v0.7 smart-contract wallet needs:

ToolPurpose
chaingpt_aa_userop_hashCompute the v0.7 userOpHash the signer signs.
chaingpt_aa_pack_useropPack a UserOp into the EntryPoint wire-format PackedUserOperation + emit the bundler-RPC JSON shape.
chaingpt_aa_estimate_useropProxy eth_estimateUserOperationGas to an admin-supplied bundler URL.
chaingpt_aa_userop_receiptProxy eth_getUserOperationReceipt to check if a userop was bundled and what the on-chain receipt looks like.

Custody-free invariant

The plugin never signs a UserOp and never sees a smart-account owner key or session key. The hash returned by chaingpt_aa_userop_hash is the input to the user's wallet (MetaMask, hardware wallet, viem signer, SCW session-key module). The user signs externally and places the signature into the UserOp's signature field before submitting via the bundler.

A unit test asserts the surface contract: no tool input schema may contain a parameter that matches `/privatekey|ownerkey|sessionkey|mnemonic|seedphrase|signer/`. Future additions that try to accept a secret will fail the build.

Foundation vs. session-key flow

ERC-4337 session keys live inside the smart-contract wallet's validator module. Every major SCW provider has its own validator with its own session-key ABI:

ProviderValidatorSession-key issuance
Safe + Zodiacsafe-protocol-kit modulesenableModule + setSessionKey
Kernel (ZeroDev)EIP-7579 modular validatorsinstallValidator
BiconomyK1Validator + sponsorshipissueSessionKey
Alchemy Smart WalletModular Account v2installPlugin
SimpleAccount (canonical reference)single owner — no session keys natively(none — add a session-key validator)

Picking one provider here would lock the plugin into that vendor's surface. Instead, this skill ships the shared primitives (packing, hashing, bundler-rpc) that every v0.7 SCW needs, and per-provider session-key issuance / use is queued as follow-up PRs:

  • chaingpt_aa_session_ (SHIPPED v1.21 — vendor-neutral Smart Sessions supersedes the per-vendor safe/kernel plan; Kernel/Safe7579 agent-side signing still queued) chaingpt_aa_safe_* — Safe enable-module + session-key enable
  • chaingpt_aa_kernel_* — Kernel install-validator + session-key install
  • (etc., one PR per provider)

Each follow-up will use chaingpt_aa_userop_hash + chaingpt_aa_estimate_userop from this foundation unchanged.

How a typical signed-userop flow uses these tools

text
1. Application code builds an unsigned UserOp:
sender, nonce, callData, gas limits, gas fees, optional paymaster.
2. Estimate gas via the bundler (admin supplies the URL):
chaingpt_aa_estimate_userop({ bundlerUrl, userOp, entryPoint? })
→ returns callGasLimit / verificationGasLimit / preVerificationGas.
Fold those back into the UserOp.
3. Compute the hash to sign:
chaingpt_aa_userop_hash({ userOp, chain, entryPoint? })
→ returns the 0x-prefixed userOpHash.
4. Sign the hash externally (this is the only step the plugin does NOT do):
- SimpleAccount, Safe (default), Kernel default: ECDSA over personal_sign of the hash.
- Some SCWs: EIP-712 typed-data signature (see your SCW's docs).
5. Set userOp.signature = the 65-byte ECDSA signature (or session-key-validator-specific encoding).
6. Submit via the bundler (you call this yourself, the plugin does not currently proxy eth_sendUserOperation):
POST { method: 'eth_sendUserOperation', params: [userOp, entryPoint] }
→ returns userOpHash.
7. Poll inclusion:
chaingpt_aa_userop_receipt({ bundlerUrl, userOpHash })
→ null until bundled, then the full receipt with tx hash + status.

Why we don't ship eth_sendUserOperation (yet)

Submitting a signed userop is the irreversible step. We deliberately leave it to the user's existing bundler-client code path so the plugin doesn't become the broadcast vector. The hash and the estimate are read-only. The receipt is read-only. The signed-submission stays in user code where it's already audited.

Bundler URL conventions

ProviderPattern
Pimlicohttps://api.pimlico.io/v2/<chain>/rpc?apikey=YOUR_KEY
Alchemy AAhttps://<chain>.bundler.alchemy.com/<API_KEY>
Stackuphttps://api.stackup.sh/v1/node/<API_KEY>
Particlehttps://bundler.particle.network/?chainId=<id> (with auth header)

Pass the full URL to bundlerUrl. The plugin does not store it.

EntryPoint addresses

VersionAddress (deterministic across chains)
v0.70x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032 (this foundation targets v0.7)
v0.60x5FF137D4b0FDCD49DcA30c7CF57E578a026d2789 (read-only inspection only)

What this skill does NOT do (yet)

  • Sign anything. The plugin returns the hash; you sign elsewhere.
  • Submit `eth_sendUserOperation`. Done in user code with the signed UserOp.
  • Per-provider session-key issuance. Safe / Kernel / Biconomy / Alchemy Smart Wallet are follow-up PRs that build on this foundation.
  • Paymaster sponsorship issuance. The paymaster* fields are accepted as inputs; sponsoring a paymaster (calling Pimlico's pm_sponsorUserOperation or equivalent) is a follow-up.
  • EIP-7702 (delegated EOAs). Different scheme; out of scope for v0.7.

Reference

  • mcp-server/src/lib/erc4337.ts — primitives (uses viem v2.20+ audited AA module).
  • mcp-server/src/tools/aa.ts — tool surface (4 tools).
  • mcp-server/src/__tests__/aa.test.ts — 30 cases including the custody-free invariant test.
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