ekkoo-z/kubetrail/image-registry-supply-chain

Image Registry Supply Chain

Use this skill when facts mention images, registries, imagePullSecrets, tags, digests, signatures, SBOM/scanner output, CI/CD runners, GitHub Actions, build jobs, or suspicious image naming.

Scope boundary:

• Owns image and build/registry trust, not runtime escape from a running container.
• Use serviceaccount-secret-material for the raw registry credential material.
• Use pod-escape-surface for dangerous runtime securityContext or mounted sockets.
• Use workload-controller-persistence for malicious controller objects using an image.

High-value evidence:

• Images without digest pinning, latest, mutable tags, typosquatted names, public Docker Hub images in system namespaces.
• Unknown or untrusted registries, unexpected cross-cloud registries, private registry pull secrets in broad namespaces.
• Image pull policy, admission signature policy, SBOM/vulnerability facts, scan disabled or stale.
• CI/CD service account tokens, GitHub/GitLab runner env, Docker config, publishing credentials.
• Image names mimicking Kubernetes components such as kube-controller, pause, proxy, metrics, or system agents.

Finding rules:

• Confirmed high: suspicious image in privileged/system workload, malicious scanner/action evidence, or registry credential ref with broad push/pull impact.
• Medium: unpinned/mutable image in high-privilege workload or untrusted registry in sensitive namespace.
• Low: hygiene issue only, such as missing digest with low privilege and no sensitive access.
• Unknown: image list exists but registry/auth/provenance facts are missing.

Useful templates:

• image-supply-chain-review
• registry-auth-verify
• admission-policy-review

Output notes:

• Separate "vulnerable image" from "malicious/provenance risk".
• Highlight images that combine supply-chain risk with privileged PodSpec or high-RBAC ServiceAccount.
• Do not claim compromise from a bad tag alone.