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Skill v1.0.0
currentAutomated scan100/100ekkoo-z/kubetrail/windows-container-surface
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PublishedSeptember 29, 2026 at 09:31 PM
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version: "1.0.0" name: windows-container-surface description: Analyze Windows node and Windows container attack surfaces, including Windows Server container boundary risk and node credential spread.
Windows Container Surface
Use this skill only when facts mention Windows nodes, Windows containers, HostProcess pods, Windows Server containers, Hyper-V isolation, Windows kubelet, or Windows-specific runtime details.
Scope boundary:
- Owns Windows-specific container and node surfaces.
- Use
pod-escape-surfacefor generic Linux pod security findings. - Use
kubelet-runtime-etcd-bypassfor kubelet/runtime API access independent of OS. - Use
serviceaccount-secret-materialfor tokens and kubeconfigs found on Windows nodes or containers.
High-value evidence:
- Windows Server containers without Hyper-V isolation, HostProcess pods, privileged-like host access, host filesystem mounts.
- Windows node OS/version, container runtime, patch level, kubelet config, node credentials.
- Workloads running common exposed Windows apps or web servers with known vulnerable versions.
- Node credential paths that can be abused after host access.
- Mixed Linux/Windows cluster movement paths and scheduling constraints.
Finding rules:
- Confirmed high: Windows container host access plus node credential or kubelet/client material.
- Medium: Windows Server container isolation risk with exposed workload or high-privilege ServiceAccount.
- Low: Windows node present with no risky workload or credential evidence.
- Unknown: OS detected but runtime/isolation details missing.
Useful templates:
windows-container-reviewserviceaccount-token-api-verifykubelet-api-verify
Output notes:
- Activate only for Windows evidence; do not include in Linux-only findings.
- Avoid assuming Windows Server containers are a hard security boundary.
- State whether Hyper-V isolation, HostProcess, or node credential evidence is known.