ericrisco/rsc-harness/deployment

Ship it — Docker, GitHub Actions, and a deploy target (Coolify · Vercel · Hetzner)

Take any app in this repo from source → hardened container → green CI/CD → live on the right host, with secrets that never leak into image layers or logs, and a defined rollback path.

source → Dockerfile (multi-stage) → CI (lint·test·build·scan) → registry (ghcr) → target (Coolify·Vercel·Hetzner, rolling) → live + rollback
                                                                                     ▲
                                                              choose via references/hosting-targets.md

Out of scope — say so and stop: Kubernetes / Helm / ECS / Nomad orchestration; cloud IaC (Terraform, Pulumi, CloudFormation — only the GHA↔cloud OIDC handshake is covered, not provisioning); application runtime code and DB schema/migration logic (the per-stack skills at the bottom own what runs inside the container).

Decision rules

Consult these first. They settle 90% of choices before you write a line.

Table A — Base image by stack

Table B — Coolify build pack

If it has a Dockerfile, use the Dockerfile pack.

Table C — Deploy strategy

Table D — Secret delivery

Docker — the canonical multi-stage shape

One process per container: no supervisord-managed bundles, let the orchestrator scale.

# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
# ---- builder: full toolchain, deps cached before source ----
FROM <builder-base> AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY <lockfile> <manifest> ./           # lockfile FIRST → cached dep layer
RUN <install-deps-from-lockfile>        # changes only when the lockfile changes
COPY . .                                # source last
RUN <build>
 
# ---- runtime: minimal, non-root, no toolchain ----
FROM <runtime-base>                      # distroless / -slim / unprivileged nginx
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=nonroot:nonroot /app/<artifact> ./
USER nonroot:nonroot
EXPOSE 8000
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
  CMD ["<readiness-probe>"]             # exec-form (distroless has no shell)
CMD ["<entrypoint>", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8000"]

# GOOD: secret consumed in-layer, never persisted
RUN --mount=type=secret,id=npm_token \
    NPM_TOKEN="$(cat /run/secrets/npm_token)" npm ci
# BAD: ARG bakes the token into image history forever
ARG NPM_TOKEN
RUN npm ci   # token now visible in `docker history`

# .dockerignore — write this before your first build
.git
node_modules
.env*
dist
.next
__pycache__
*.log
coverage
Dockerfile*
compose*
README.md
.github

DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker build --secret id=npm_token,env=NPM_TOKEN -t app:dev .

→ full per-stack Dockerfiles: references/dockerfiles-by-stack.md · image-authoring depth (shrinking, base-image choice, cache busting): ../docker/SKILL.md

docker-compose for local dev + Postgres

# compose.yaml — Compose Spec, no `version:` key
services:
  app:
    build:
      context: .
      target: dev                       # dev stage of the multi-stage Dockerfile
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"
    volumes:
      - .:/app                          # bind mount → hot reload
      - /app/.venv                      # anonymous volume guards container deps
    environment:
      DATABASE_URL: postgres://postgres:postgres@db:5432/app_dev
    develop:
      watch:
        - { path: ./pyproject.toml, action: rebuild }
        - { path: ./app, action: sync, target: /app/app }
    depends_on:
      db:
        condition: service_healthy
  db:
    image: postgres:18-alpine
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:5432:5432"           # host-only; NEVER 0.0.0.0 in prod
    environment:
      POSTGRES_USER: postgres
      POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
      POSTGRES_DB: app_dev
    volumes:
      - pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U postgres -d app_dev"]
      interval: 5s
      timeout: 3s
      retries: 5
 
volumes:
  pgdata:

• GOOD: bind-mount source for dev hot reload; BAD: bind-mount source over a prod image (it shadows the baked build).
• GOOD: bind Postgres to 127.0.0.1; BAD: bind it to 0.0.0.0 in prod (publicly reachable DB).

→ prod overlay + mailpit: references/dockerfiles-by-stack.md

GitHub Actions — least-privilege pipeline

# .github/workflows/ci.yml
name: ci
on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
permissions:
  contents: read                        # default-deny; escalate per job
concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
  verify:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - run: bash scripts/verify.sh
  build-push:
    needs: verify
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
      packages: write
      id-token: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
      - uses: docker/login-action@v3
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.actor }}
          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
      - id: meta
        uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
        with:
          images: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
          tags: |
            type=sha
            type=semver,pattern={{version}}
      - uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
        with:
          push: true
          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
          cache-from: type=gha
          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
          provenance: true
      - uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@57a97c7e7821a5776cebc9bb87c984fa69cba8f1 # v0.35.0
        with:
          image-ref: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:sha-${{ github.sha }}
          exit-code: "1"
          severity: "HIGH,CRITICAL"
          ignore-unfixed: true

• GOOD: scoped per-job permissions (only build-push gets packages: write / id-token: write).
• BAD: blanket permissions: write-all — any compromised step can push images or mint tokens.
• GOOD: third-party actions pinned to a full commit SHA with a version comment (@<sha> # v0.35.0). In the March 2026 trivy-action supply-chain incident (GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 / CVE-2026-33634), 76 of 77 tags were force-pushed to credential-stealing malware; the advisory's named known-safe ref is v0.35.0 (commit 57a97c7e7821a5776cebc9bb87c984fa69cba8f1), the one clean tag still pointing at the real master HEAD. A moving tag would have pulled the malware; this SHA pin does not. Let Dependabot bump the SHA once upstream re-tags cleanly.

→ matrix, reusable workflows, OIDC-to-cloud, environments/approvals, releases: references/github-actions.md · workflow-syntax depth: ../github-actions/SKILL.md

Choosing a deploy target (3 options)

Never recommend a single host. Gather requirements → recommend exactly three targets with trade-offs, so the choice is made with eyes open. The canonical slate:

1. Hetzner VPS + Coolify — cheapest control, EU residency, sustained/always-on/stateful;

you own ops. (The combo references/coolify.md runs on; see below.)

1. Vercel — zero-ops serverless/edge, ideal Next.js, scales to zero for spiky traffic;

metered cost climbs at sustained scale, US-default region.

1. A third that fits the case's sharpest constraint — Railway (tiny/simple, predictable

bill), Fly.io (true global edge, 30+ regions), or a hyperscaler (enterprise compliance).

Requirements to gather first: expected total/concurrent users · traffic shape (steady vs spiky) · budget ceiling · data region/residency & compliance · team ops comfort · scaling needs (scale-to-zero, global latency) · stateful needs (own DB/queue/websockets).

Quick steer: Next.js + spiky traffic + ops-averse → Vercel. Cost-sensitive / EU-resident / sustained / own stateful services → Hetzner+Coolify. The Dockerfile this skill produces is the escape hatch — start on Vercel, move to Hetzner+Coolify when the bill grows, same artifact.

→ deep coverage (limits, regions, pricing, decision matrix, worked examples): references/hosting-targets.md

Coolify — wiring the chosen target

Only the parts that touch the pipeline; the platform walkthrough lives elsewhere.

• Pick the Dockerfile build pack when a Dockerfile exists — same artifact CI builds, full control, prod/CI parity.
• Set Ports Exposes to the container port your app listens on (e.g. 8000); Traefik routes the domain to it.
• Set the Health Check path/port → this is what gates the rolling swap to the new container.
• Mark sensitive env vars Is Secret — encrypted at rest, masked in logs and UI.
• Enable GitHub App auto-deploy on push, OR call the deploy webhook from CI (one or the other, not both).
• Rollback = redeploy a previously stored image in one click; pair with backward-compatible migrations.

curl --fail -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $COOLIFY_TOKEN" \
  "https://coolify.example.com/api/v1/deploy?uuid=$APP_UUID&force=false"

→ persistent storage, custom domains + Let's Encrypt, per-PR previews, CPU/memory limits, blue-green: references/coolify.md and ../coolify/SKILL.md

Secrets flow (GitHub → registry → Coolify)

GitHub secrets / OIDC ──mint short-lived creds──▶ build pushes to ghcr.io (no key stored)
     │                                                        │
     └──── nothing long-lived in a workflow file             ▼
                                       Coolify pulls (deploy-scoped registry cred)
                                                     │
                                                     ▼
                                runtime env injected by Coolify (encrypted at rest)

• A secret crosses at most one trust boundary per hop — never forward a GHA secret into the running container; let Coolify inject runtime env.
• Nothing long-lived lives in a workflow file: GITHUB_TOKEN and OIDC tokens are minted per run and expire.
• ${{ }} secrets are masked in logs, but set -x and echo "$SECRET" defeat the mask — forbid both.

12-factor config & observability