francescostabile/numasec/forensics-kit

Forensics & IR kit

Rule of engagement. Forensics work runs on copies. Never analyze a live victim system in place — cp/dd to a workspace, hash the original, and work on the copy. Every finding must reference the SHA256 of the artifact so chain-of-custody survives.

Output contract. Each IOC, carved artifact, or suspicious observation is a candidate observation (severity medium+ for IOCs, confidence high for exact matches, medium for heuristic hits).

When to load

Toolbox

1. file + exiftool + strings — first-3-minutes triage

Before anything heavier, always identify the artifact and skim it.

file suspicious.bin
exiftool suspicious.bin
strings -n 8 suspicious.bin | head -200
strings -eL -n 8 suspicious.bin | head -100   # UTF-16LE (Windows PE)

Interpretation. file gives format/arch. exiftool surfaces author/tool metadata. strings reveals hard-coded URLs, C2 hostnames, file paths, error messages, library imports.

2. binwalk — Carve embedded content

binwalk -B firmware.bin          # signature scan
binwalk -e firmware.bin          # extract what it recognizes
binwalk -E firmware.bin          # entropy (encryption/compression indicator)

Severity hints. Firmware that carves cleanly to a shell script + a busybox → high if it contains credentials. Very-high uniform entropy → encrypted blob; flag and move on.

3. tshark — Packet capture analysis

# 1-line summary of protocols
tshark -r capture.pcapng -q -z io,phs
 
# HTTP requests
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y http.request -T fields -e ip.dst -e http.host -e http.request.uri | sort -u
 
# DNS queries
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y dns -T fields -e dns.qry.name | sort -u | head -50
 
# Suspicious destinations (non-RFC1918)
tshark -r capture.pcapng -T fields -e ip.dst | sort -u | grep -vE '^(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.)'
 
# TLS SNI (see what hosts are being contacted even under HTTPS)
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y "tls.handshake.type == 1" -T fields -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name | sort -u
 
# Extract objects (HTTP, SMB)
mkdir -p /tmp/tshark-export
tshark -r capture.pcapng --export-objects http,/tmp/tshark-export

Interpretation. Unknown SNI + sustained beacon interval ≈ C2 candidate. Non-RFC1918 destinations in an internal capture → exfiltration candidate.

4. volatility (Volatility 3) — Memory forensics

# Identify the profile implicitly (Volatility 3 auto-detects)
vol -f memory.dmp windows.info
vol -f memory.dmp windows.pslist
vol -f memory.dmp windows.pstree
vol -f memory.dmp windows.cmdline
vol -f memory.dmp windows.netscan
vol -f memory.dmp windows.malfind       # heuristics for injected code
vol -f memory.dmp windows.dlllist --pid <PID>
vol -f memory.dmp windows.hashdump      # SAM hashes
 
# Linux equivalents
vol -f memory.dmp linux.pslist
vol -f memory.dmp linux.bash            # recovered shell history

Severity hints. malfind hit with RWX region and MZ header → high, confidence medium. hashdump success → critical (credential exposure).

5. radare2 — Binary RE

r2 -A suspicious.elf
# Inside r2:
#   afl       list functions
#   s main; pdf    disassemble main
#   iz        print strings
#   ii        imports
#   aaaa      deeper analysis

For one-liners:

rabin2 -z suspicious.elf        # strings in data sections
rabin2 -I suspicious.elf        # binary info
rabin2 -i suspicious.elf        # imports

6. YARA — Signature-based hunting

# Install: apt install yara
# Quick hunt using an existing ruleset
yara -r /opt/rules/index.yar suspicious.bin
 
# Directory scan
yara -r /opt/rules/index.yar /mnt/image/
 
# Author a rule from observed strings
cat > /tmp/demo.yar <<'EOF'
rule demo_c2 {
    meta:
        author = "numasec"
        description = "heuristic: hard-coded C2 host"
    strings:
        $s1 = "evil-c2.example.com"
        $s2 = { 4D 5A }   // MZ header
    condition:
        $s1 and $s2
}
EOF
yara /tmp/demo.yar suspicious.bin

Good rulesets to start from (no key required):

• YARA Rules project: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules
• Neo23x0 Signature-Base: https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base

7. Hashing + Chain-of-custody hygiene

sha256sum artifact.bin > artifact.bin.sha256
# Every observation references $(cut -d' ' -f1 artifact.bin.sha256)

Also keep a copy of ls -la artifact.bin and stat artifact.bin so mtime/ctime are recorded.

Standard triage opening

For an unknown artifact:

1. sha256sum + file + exiftool + strings | head.
2. If it's a binary: binwalk -E (entropy) → binwalk -e if entropy is moderate → radare2 -A if interesting.
3. If it's a pcap: tshark -z io,phs → HTTP/DNS dumps → SNI → export objects.
4. If it's a memory image: vol windows.info → pslist → netscan → malfind → hashdump.
5. Run YARA with a generic ruleset.
6. Summarize IOCs (hosts, hashes, paths, mutexes, registry keys) into observations.
7. Cross-reference IOCs against cve tool (T10) and any open-source threat intel the operator has.

What this skill does NOT do

• No live acquisition. Operator pre-acquires memory/disk.
• No cloud forensics (AWS CloudTrail parsing, GCP audit logs). Those need a dedicated skill pack.
• No automated malware detonation / sandboxing. Use Cuckoo/CAPE externally if needed.

Escalation

After triage:

• If a binary has exploitable defects → hand off to the hacking agent via task tool.
• If an IR finding needs remediation code changes → hand off to the appsec agent.
• If the pcap shows sustained C2 → open a parallel threat-intel subtask (security agent).