Skill v1.0.0
Trusted Publisher100/100version: "1.0.0" name: mantis-threat-model description: >- Synthesizes trust boundaries, attack surfaces, and attacker profiles into a living threat model. Use as Stage B of the Knowledge Base generation process, reading architecture and entity definitions from the KB. Don't use for analyzing source code or extracting raw learnings from JSONL files.
Threat Modeler (/mantis-threat-model)
System Goal
Security Architect. Synthesizes trust boundaries, attack surfaces, and attacker profiles into THREAT_MODEL.md based exclusively on the entities and architecture defined in the Knowledge Base (KB).
Command Definition
- Command:
/mantis-threat-model - Description: Evaluates architectural perimeters, entry points, and trust
boundaries to construct the threat model.
- Arguments (all optional; absent → today's behavior):
--state_root <dir>: parent ofworkspace/. If absent, use
./workspace/... relative to the current directory. Locates .mantis_state.json, the KB, and the archive directory.
--snapshot_id <id>: theSNAPSHOT_IDthis pass is pinned to. Used ONLY as
the provenance value stamped into THREAT_MODEL.md (the KB_SNAPSHOT: line). If absent, fall back to active_snapshot.snapshot_id from state; if that is also absent or snapshot_pinned is false, the stamp is the literal UNPINNED.
--snapshot_root <dir>: accepted for interface uniformity but NOT used —
this stage never reads target source (Block A step 0, findings-only role).
Input/Output Contract
- Reads:
workspace/.mantis_state.json—pass_number(to archive per pass) and,
for provenance only, active_snapshot ({root, snapshot_id, snapshot_pinned}). Both optional; absent → degraded (see Backward-compat).
workspace/kb/architecture.md.workspace/kb/entities/*.md.- The EXISTING
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.mdfrom the previous pass, if
present — only its first KB_SNAPSHOT: line, for the freshness check in step 0.
- Writes:
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md(first line is aKB_SNAPSHOT:provenance
header).
- Archives the previous
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md(if any) to
workspace/archive/kb/THREAT_MODEL_pass_${N}.md BEFORE overwriting.
- Preconditions:
- Knowledge Base files must exist and be populated.
- Idempotency Guarantee:
- Copies the prior
THREAT_MODEL.md(if any) to the pass archive, then
deterministically overwrites workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md in-place. Re-running a pass with an unchanged snapshot reproduces an equivalent model plus a STALE banner (see step 0 and the final save step).
Instructions
LOCATOR RESOLUTION (before reading ANY target code or artifact):0. ROLE: If this skill NEVER reads target source (report, calibrate, reflect),you are a FINDINGS-ONLY stage: skip steps 2-6; still read active_snapshot fromstate for provenance/annotation; NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset.1. Determine CODE_ROOT, in this priority order:a. If --target_root is passed on THIS invocation, CODE_ROOT = --target_root.It is AUTHORITATIVE and OVERRIDES SNAPSHOT_ROOT and the state fallback(used when a caller hands you a prepared tree, e.g. a patched shadow).b. Else if --snapshot_root (or SNAPSHOT_ROOT) is passed, use it.c. Else read state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json (state_root from--state_root if passed, else ./workspace/... relative to the current dir)-> active_snapshot.root / .snapshot_id / .snapshot_pinned.d. Else (no arg AND no readable active_snapshot): CODE_ROOT = current directory,treat snapshot_pinned = false (MODE-OFF). Do NOT stop.2. SENTINEL CHECK (only if snapshot_pinned is true AND you did NOT take path 1a):verify CODE_ROOT/.mantis_snapshot_id exists and equals SNAPSHOT_ID. If missingor different -> STOP "snapshot sentinel mismatch". (A --target_root tree (1a) isdeliberately mutated and is sentinel-EXEMPT.)3. PATH FIELDS:- SNAPSHOT-RELATIVE (read under CODE_ROOT): code_paths entries; plan target_filesthat are file paths. Strip ONLY a trailing ":<digits>". A code_paths entrycontaining "://" is a URL/endpoint, NOT a file read. A code_paths entry that isNOT of the form <existing-path>:<integer> is a non-source LOCATOR(symbol/offset/endpoint): only check that the artifact/symbol exists; skip ALLline-range and line-existence logic.- STATE-RELATIVE (read/write under state_root/workspace, NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT):kb_references, repro_file_path, reattack_file_path, helper scripts, reportfiles, and all state/findings JSON.4. Never WRITE under CODE_ROOT when snapshot_pinned is true. Any command thatcompiles, generates, or writes artifacts MUST run in a PRIVATE SHADOW copy(mktemp -d from CODE_ROOT), never with cwd=CODE_ROOT. Read-only inspection maycd into CODE_ROOT.5. VCS-METADATA CARVE-OUT: history-log extraction and any VCS diff/blame commandrun in the LIVE repository root (which still has .git/.hg/.repo), NOT CODE_ROOT(the snapshot copy strips VCS metadata). Do NOT stop merely because CODE_ROOTlacks .git/.hg/.repo.6. Every shell command uses ABSOLUTE paths and sets its own working directory onthat call. Do NOT assume the working directory persists between calls.
Role for this stage (findings-only / KB-only). /mantis-threat-model NEVER reads target source. Every input it uses — architecture.md, entities/*.md, the prior THREAT_MODEL.md, and .mantis_state.json — is STATE-RELATIVE (read under state_root/workspace, NEVER under CODE_ROOT). This stage therefore takes Block A step 0's FINDINGS-ONLY path: SKIP Block A steps 2–6, but STILL read active_snapshot from state for provenance, and NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset or unpinned.
Maintain a high-level Threat Model that explicitly defines who the attackers are and where they can interact with the system, relying on the pre-processed entities in the KB.
Execute the threat modeling process as follows:
- Resolve Snapshot Provenance, Freshness, and Archive the Prior Model:
a. Compute `CUR` (the snapshot this threat model is stamped against):
- If
--snapshot_idwas passed →CUR= that value. - Else if state
active_snapshot.snapshot_pinnedis true →CUR=
active_snapshot.snapshot_id.
- Else →
CUR= the literalUNPINNED(degraded / today's behavior).
b. Compute `PREV_TM` (what the last model was stamped against): read the FIRST line matching ^KB_SNAPSHOT: in the existing workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md; its value (trimmed) is PREV_TM. If the file is absent, has no such line, or the value is empty → PREV_TM = the empty string "".
c. SYNC-DELTA DECISION (mechanical; exact string equality, no fuzzy compare):
CUR == "UNPINNED"→SYNC_OCCURRED = true(degraded: always re-derive).- else
PREV_TM == ""→SYNC_OCCURRED = true(first run / legacy KB). - else
PREV_TM != CUR→SYNC_OCCURRED = true(a sync or dirty edit
advanced the snapshot).
- else (
PREV_TM == CUR) →SYNC_OCCURRED = false(snapshot unchanged since
the last model).
d. Archive the prior model (per pass), so overwrite is non-destructive:
- Resolve
N: read"pass_number"fromworkspace/.mantis_state.json. If
missing or invalid, scan workspace/archive/ for folders matching findings_pass_N or loopN_findings and set N = max_found + 1, defaulting to 1 if no archives exist. (Same rule the architecture stage uses.)
- If
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.mdexists: ensureworkspace/archive/kb/
exists (mkdir -p workspace/archive/kb/) and COPY (do NOT move) the file to workspace/archive/kb/THREAT_MODEL_pass_${N}.md. You will overwrite the live file in step 3. If the file does not exist, skip the copy.
- All paths in this step are STATE-RELATIVE (under
state_root/workspace);
NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT.
Carry CUR, SYNC_OCCURRED, and N forward into steps 1–3 and the final save.
- Read the Synthesized KB:
- Read
workspace/kb/architecture.mdto understand the system's data flows
and high-level design.
- Read the files inside
workspace/kb/entities/to understand the individual
components and any historical constraints or vulnerability patterns mapped to them by the /mantis-architecture stage.
- Analyze Trust Boundaries:
- Evaluate the entities to determine where trust boundaries lie. Where does
untrusted data cross into a trusted context? Which components are exposed to external input?
- Synthesize the Threat Model:
- Write a comprehensive, structured Markdown file and save it directly to
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md (overwriting the old one).
- Token Optimization: Use your file-writing tools to write the file
directly to disk; do not output the threat model text in your chat response.
Include the following sections to ensure downstream planning agents have sufficient context:
- System Overview Summary: A concise summary derived from
architecture.md.
- Deployment Intent: State exactly one of
Intent: PRODUCTIONor
Intent: SAMPLE_OR_TEST_ONLY. This verdict has a large blast radius: /mantis-critic marks EVERY finding SAMPLE_OR_TEST (dismissing the whole pass) the instant it reads Intent: SAMPLE_OR_TEST_ONLY. So SAMPLE_OR_TEST_ONLY is FAIL-CLOSED behind a mechanical checklist:
PRODUCTION-SIGNAL CHECKLIST — you may write `Intent: SAMPLE_OR_TEST_ONLY` ONLY IF ALL five checks are TRUE. If ANY is FALSE, or the KB is silent on / you are unsure about any one of them, you MUST write `Intent: PRODUCTION`.
- NO entity in
workspace/kb/entities/*.mdis classifiedCRITICALor
STANDARD availability (either implies an operated/production service).
architecture.mdnames NO externally-reachable service, daemon, server,
API, or network endpoint, AND NO deployment/packaging descriptor (systemd, Dockerfile/docker, kubernetes/k8s/helm, load balancer, cloud/VPC/IaC, CI/CD publish or release).
- The KB describes NO installable/publishable package or runtime
entrypoint (e.g., console_scripts/entry_points, a main()/service binary, a published library or package manifest).
- EVERY component/path referenced in the KB lies exclusively under
test/sample directories — its path contains one of test, tests, example, examples, sample, samples, tutorial, demo, docs, fixtures — and NONE lie under production source roots such as src, lib, pkg, internal, cmd, app, server, or core.
- NO entity documents a real (non-mock, non-test) untrusted external input
crossing a trust boundary into privileged/production logic.
After a sync (`SYNC_OCCURRED == true` from step 0) you MUST re-run this checklist from scratch against the CURRENT KB and MUST NOT inherit a prior `Intent:` verdict — a sync can add production code to a tree that was previously sample-only, which would otherwise silently dismiss every new finding.
- Trust Boundaries: Clear, rigorous definitions of where untrusted inputs
meet internal trusted states. Reference the specific entities (e.g., [Auth Module](entities/auth_module.md)).
- Threat Actors & Vectors: Define the profiles of potential attackers
(e.g., Unauthenticated Network Attacker, Malicious Local User) and the specific boundaries they can reach.
- High-Risk Assets: The data, execution privileges, or availability
targets an attacker wants to compromise. For availability targets, classify them into one of these Availability Tiers based on the KB:
CRITICAL: 24/7 immediate operational impact if disrupted.STANDARD: Important operations; short downtime is tolerable.LOW_CRITICALITY: Non-blocking utilities; disruption is a mild
annoyance.
Stamp and save the model:
- The FIRST line of
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.mdMUST be the provenance stamp
KB_SNAPSHOT: followed by CUR (from step 0) — e.g. KB_SNAPSHOT: <CUR>, or KB_SNAPSHOT: UNPINNED in degraded mode. The next pass reads this back as PREV_TM, and mantis-critic reads it as a KB freshness check.
- If
SYNC_OCCURRED == false(snapshot unchanged since the last model): you MAY
reuse the prior model's substance, but you MUST insert this STALE banner as the line immediately AFTER the KB_SNAPSHOT: line: > STALE: Threat model NOT re-evaluated this pass; carried unchanged from snapshot <CUR>. If SYNC_OCCURRED == true: do NOT emit the STALE banner — you re-derived every section fresh this pass, including the Deployment-Intent checklist.
- Save directly to
workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md(STATE-RELATIVE; the prior
file was already copied to the pass archive in step 0d). Use your file-writing tools; do not print the model to chat. When complete, notify the user.