id: mobile-security version: "1.0.0" title: "Mobile Application Security" description: "Android and iOS hardening: exported components, ATS, keychain, certificate pinning, root/jailbreak detection" category: hardening severity: high applies_to:

• "when generating Android (Kotlin / Java) app code or manifests"
• "when generating iOS (Swift / Objective-C) app code"
• "when generating React Native / Flutter native modules"

languages: ["kotlin", "java", "swift", "objc", "dart", "javascript", "typescript", "xml", "plist"] token_budget: minimal: 1000 compact: 1200 full: 2500 rules_path: "checklists/" related_skills: ["crypto-misuse", "secret-detection", "auth-security"] last_updated: "2026-06-20" sources:

• "OWASP MASVS v2.0"
• "OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG)"
• "CWE-919, CWE-921, CWE-925, CWE-926"
• "Apple Platform Security Guide"
• "Android Developers — App Security Best Practices"

Mobile Application Security

Rules (for AI agents)

ALWAYS

• Android: every <activity>, <service>, <receiver>, <provider> in

AndroidManifest.xml either has android:exported="false" or explicitly declares an intent filter and is intentionally exported. As of Android 12 (API 31), android:exported is required when an intent-filter is declared.

• Android: store secrets in the Android Keystore (KeyStore /

EncryptedSharedPreferences with MasterKey). Never in plain SharedPreferences, plain files, or BuildConfig.

• iOS: store secrets in the Keychain with

kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly or stricter. Don't store in UserDefaults, plist, or files.

• iOS: keep App Transport Security (ATS) enabled in Info.plist. If an

exception is required, scope it to a specific host with NSExceptionDomains.

• Validate the server's TLS certificate with certificate pinning (public

key pinning preferred) for backends you control. Use OkHttp.CertificatePinner on Android, URLSessionDelegate didReceiveChallenge on iOS, or your framework's pinning module.

• Obfuscate / shrink release builds (Android R8 / ProGuard with

proguard-rules.pro; iOS bitcode + Swift symbol stripping). Strip debug logs from release builds.

• Detect rooted / jailbroken devices for high-risk apps (banking, payment,

enterprise) and reduce sensitivity (block payments, refuse to attach to a managed profile). Use the Play Integrity API on Android and DeviceCheck / AppAttest on iOS as the authoritative attestation.

NEVER

• Ship API keys, signing keys, or backend secrets in source / resources /

strings.xml / BuildConfig / Info.plist. Issue short-lived, device-scoped tokens from a backend instead.

• Set android:allowBackup="true" for apps that store credentials — the

backed-up data is readable on developer machines. Use android:fullBackupContent to exclude sensitive paths.

• Set android:debuggable="true" in release builds, or

<application android:networkSecurityConfig> that allows cleartext to arbitrary hosts.

• Disable ATS app-wide on iOS (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads=true). If you must

weaken it, scope per-host.

• Implement custom TLS / certificate handling that returns "trust all"

(X509TrustManager.checkServerTrusted empty body, URLSessionDelegate always-trust). This is the #1 Android security finding shipped to production.

• Pass user input to WebView.loadUrl / WKWebView.load without scheme

validation; never enable WebSettings.setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) or setUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(true).

• Implement biometric auth without BiometricPrompt's

setUserAuthenticationRequired(true) binding the key — biometric "true" alone proves nothing without a cryptographic challenge.

• Log full request/response bodies including Authorization headers — they

end up in adb / xcrun logs.

KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

• Public read-only IDs (analytics public key, public DSN) embedded in the

binary are not secrets; they're meant to be there.

• The default debuggable=true on debug variants is normal — the rule applies

to release builds.

• Custom URL schemes (myapp://) for OAuth callbacks are expected; ensure

the corresponding intent filter is restricted and the state parameter is verified.

Context (for humans)

Mobile security splits cleanly into what's in the binary (secrets, debug flags, exported components, pinning) and what happens at runtime (TLS trust, keychain access, biometric binding). OWASP MASVS v2 provides the authoritative testable controls; the MASTG is the procedural test guide.

AI assistants frequently generate Android code with allowBackup=true, no ProGuard, hardcoded API keys in strings.xml, and iOS code that calls SecCertificateCreateWithData with no verification. This skill is the counterweight.

Verify & lock (triaging a finding)

A scanner/review hit is a candidate, not a confirmed bug. Confirm it, fix it, then lock it so it can't come back.

1. Confirm it's real (probe the suspect input). For a hardcoded secret,

strings/grep -r the built .apk/.ipa (and strings.xml / BuildConfig / Info.plist) — real if a live API/signing/backend key is present (not a public DSN or analytics ID, which are FPs). For plaintext storage, pull SharedPreferences/files (Android) or read UserDefaults/plist/Keychain dump (iOS) on-device — real if the token/PII is readable in clear. For missing pinning / cleartext, MITM the app through a proxy — real if traffic decrypts despite an untrusted CA, or NSAllowsArbitraryLoads/cleartext-to-arbitrary-host is set. For an exported component / deep link, fire the intent (am start) or open myapp://... from another app — real if it executes an action without the caller's permission or state/scheme check.

1. Fix, then lock with a regression test (unit or integration — dev's call):

assert the secret is absent from the built bundle and that storage contains no plaintext token (read it back, expect ciphertext/Keystore/Keychain); add a config test asserting NSAllowsArbitraryLoads/cleartext is disabled, pinning is configured, and the component is exported="false" (or its scheme/state is validated). Include a benign case (a public ID is allowed; a legitimately exported activity with a guarded intent filter still passes). Commit it to CI so the guard can't be silently dropped in a later refactor.

References

• checklists/android_manifest.yaml
• checklists/ios_keychain_ats.yaml
• OWASP MASVS v2.0.
• OWASP MASTG.
• CWE-919 — Weaknesses in Mobile Applications.