version: "1.0.0" name: api-mongo-agg-facet-bypass description: > Bypass a MongoDB aggregation-pipeline stage allowlist by nesting disallowed read stages inside $facet, then $unionWith/$lookup sibling collections to exfiltrate secrets (invite tokens, creds, hashes). Load when: an endpoint accepts a user-supplied pipeline (or errors like "operator-form queries not accepted, use the pipeline parameter"), a Node/Express + MongoDB backend, 24-hex _ids, or an "advanced query" API. Authorized targets only. domain: api type: technique stability: learning modes: [pentest, bugbounty] severity: high owasp: [A03:2021-Injection] cwe: [CWE-943] schema_version: 1

MongoDB aggregation injection — $facet allowlist bypass → cross-collection read

When it applies

• An API runs a user-controlled aggregation pipeline on a fixed collection

(db.collection('x').aggregate(userPipeline)), usually exposed as a pipeline query/body parameter for "advanced" search.

• The server defends with a stage allowlist — only screens the top-level stage

names ($match/$project/$sort/$limit/$facet allowed; $lookup/$unionWith/$group/… rejected with something like "invalid or disallowed pipeline stage").

• Tell-tale that a pipeline param even exists: sending the normal search term as a

Mongo operator object (?q[$ne]=x) returns a hint such as "Operator-form queries not accepted on 'q'. Use the 'pipeline' parameter…".

Why it works

The allowlist inspects only the outermost stage keys. `$facet` runs sub-pipelines whose stages are never re-screened by the app, so a disallowed read stage placed inside a $facet sub-pipeline reaches MongoDB unchecked. MongoDB itself still forbids a few stages inside $facet ($out/$merge/$collStats/$indexStats/$listCatalog/$documents), but it permits `$lookup` and `$unionWith` there — and those read other collections in the same database. That turns a "search our metadata" endpoint into "read any collection in this DB".

Method

1. Confirm the pipeline sink & allowlist. Baseline ?pipeline=[{"$limit":1}] returns

docs; ?pipeline=[{"$count":"n"}] / $group / top-level $unionWith → "disallowed stage".

1. Leak the namespace. Trigger a Mongo error (e.g. $facet containing a stage Mongo

rejects) — the 500 body usually includes "ns":"<db>.<collection>". Now you know the DB.

1. Read a sibling collection (drop the base docs first so output is only the target):

``json [{"$facet":{"r":[ {"$match":{"<anyfield>":"__none__"}}, {"$unionWith":{"coll":"<target_collection>","pipeline":[{"$limit":20}]}} ]}}] ` $unionWith here is legal ONLY inside $facet` (top-level → allowlist rejects it).

1. Enumerate collection names you don't know: build one $facet with many sub-pipelines,

each $unionWith-ing a candidate name + $limit:1; names that return docs exist & are non-empty. Brute the same naming style as any collection you already know (e.g. known mds_entries ⇒ try pending_invites, operator_accounts, invite_tokens).

1. Loot the target collection (invite tokens, password hashes, session docs, API keys)

and pivot (register/login, crack hashes, forge sessions).

Tools

• curl -G --data-urlencode 'pipeline=…' (single-quote so the shell doesn't eat $), or a

short Python urllib helper that JSON-encodes and URL-encodes the pipeline (cleaner for building big $facet maps and parsing results). See aegis/exploit-dev/*.py for a worked helper.

Gotchas

• Shell `$` expansion: "?q[$ne]=x" in double quotes becomes ?q[]=x in bash/zsh —

you'll wrongly conclude "not injectable". Use single quotes / --data-urlencode.

• `$unionWith`/`$lookup` are same-database only. Cross-DB {from:{db,coll}} is a hard

MongoDB block ("not supported for db: X") for everything except a couple of config.* system namespaces (empty on standalone). If the app data seems missing, it's almost always a collection-name you haven't guessed in the same DB — not a different DB.

• $collStats/$listCatalog/$documents can't nest in $facet (Mongo rejects) — so you can't

cheaply list empty collections; rely on $unionWith name-brute for non-empty ones.

• Empty $unionWith/$lookup result = collection empty or absent; the two look identical.

Verify success

Step 3/4 returns documents whose fields differ from the base collection (e.g. a token/password/session field where the endpoint should only ever return metadata). That is data exfiltration from a collection the endpoint never intended to expose.

Learned on

AEGIS lab, 2026-08 — GET /api/v1/aegis-mds/search?pipeline= on aegis_mds.mds_entries; $facet→$unionWith pending_invites leaked an unredeemed 64-hex WebAuthn invite token → register/begin (attestation:"none") → software authenticator → login. Full worked example in aegis/notes.md (§4–6).