noorqureshi/security-skills/cloud-azure

Azure / Entra ID attacks

When it applies

Target on Azure and you have some access — SSRF into a VM/App Service with a Managed Identity, a leaked service-principal secret/cert, or a foothold. Goal: steal tokens, abuse Entra roles, reach resources.

Why it works

Azure resources authenticate via Managed Identities and service principals; the IMDS hands out OAuth tokens for them. Entra (Azure AD) roles and app permissions are widely over-assigned, and several (adding credentials to a service principal, role assignment, Owner on a subscription) escalate to control.

Method

1. Managed Identity → token (via SSRF, or on the host): `GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/

oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/ with header Metadata: true (→ cloud-imds-ssrf`). Also request tokens for Graph, Key Vault, Storage.

1. Authenticate & enumerate: az login with the SP or token; enumerate roles/resources; map

Entra with AzureHound (BloodHound for Azure); ScoutSuite/MicroBurst for misconfig.

1. Entra / IAM privesc: add credentials to a service principal you can manage → auth as it;

abusive Entra roles (Application/Cloud App Admin, Privileged Role Admin); role assignment (Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write) → grant yourself Owner; consent grants.

1. Resources & secrets: Key Vault (token for vault.azure.net), Storage blobs

(→ storage misconfig), Automation Accounts / runbooks (RCE as their identity), App Service.

1. Prove impact read-only as the escalated principal; avoid persistent role changes.

Gotchas

• Two planes: ARM (resources) and Microsoft Graph / Entra (identity) — get tokens for the right resource/audience.
• Managed-identity SSRF needs the Metadata: true header — header-less SSRF won't work (that's the mitigation).
• AzureHound reveals Entra attack paths you'd miss manually — run it early.

Verify success

Escalated access proven — a token/role letting you act beyond your start (Key Vault secret read, subscription role you granted, resource action as a managed identity).

References

Azure IMDS & Managed Identity docs; AzureHound/BloodHound; MicroBurst; Entra privesc research.