version: "1.0.0" name: code-review-java description: > Security review of Java code — dangerous sinks and Spring pitfalls. Load when reviewing a Java/ Spring codebase/PR, on .java source in scope, or "review this Java". Signals: pom.xml/build.gradle, Spring/Spring Boot, ObjectInputStream, XML parsers, Runtime.exec, JNDI/lookups. domain: code-review type: reference stability: learning modes: [bugbounty, defense, pentest] severity: info cwe: [CWE-502, CWE-611, CWE-78, CWE-89, CWE-917] tools: [semgrep, codeql, find-sec-bugs, ripgrep] schema_version: 1

Java / Spring source review

When it applies

Reviewing Java source, most often a Spring/Spring Boot service. Java's biggest hitters are deserialization, XXE-by-default, and expression-language injection — all high impact and all grep-able.

Why it works

Several Java APIs are unsafe by default (XML parsers resolve external entities; ObjectInputStream instantiates arbitrary classes) and frameworks expose powerful expression languages (SpEL/OGNL) that turn a string into code. Tracing the source to a request parameter or message body confirms reach.

Sinks & patterns (grep, then trace to user input)

• Deserialization: ObjectInputStream.readObject, Jackson enableDefaultTyping/polymorphic

types, XMLDecoder, SnakeYAML new Yaml().load, unsafe readValue with type info → RCE gadgets.

• XXE: DocumentBuilderFactory, SAXParser, XMLInputFactory, TransformerFactory without

setFeature(disallow-doctype)/secure-processing.

• Command exec: Runtime.getRuntime().exec, ProcessBuilder with concatenated input.
• Expression injection: SpEL (SpelExpressionParser, @Value("#{...}") on input), OGNL

(Struts), MVEL; template engines with unescaped output.

• SQL/HQL: Statement/string-built queries, createQuery with concatenation.
• SSRF: URL.openConnection, RestTemplate, HttpClient, WebClient on user URLs.
• JNDI: InitialContext.lookup, log4j-style ${jndi:...} (Log4Shell) reachable from input.

Framework specifics

• Spring: mass assignment via @ModelAttribute/DataBinder (missing setAllowedFields),

exposed/unsecured Actuator endpoints, @RequestMapping path traversal, permit-all misconfig in SecurityFilterChain, SpEL in @PreAuthorize.

• Struts/older MVC: OGNL injection (S2-* CVEs).

Method

1. rg for the sinks; trace to controller params, headers, or message consumers.
2. Check XML parser factory configuration everywhere XML is read.
3. Review the Spring Security config for accidental permitAll()/disabled CSRF on state-changing routes.
4. Confirm with web-deserialization, web-xxe, web-ssrf, or web-command-injection.

Gotchas

• Jackson is safe unless default/polymorphic typing is enabled — check for it specifically.
• find-sec-bugs/CodeQL surface candidates; you still must prove input reaches the sink.
• Log4Shell-style lookups can fire from headers (User-Agent, X-Forwarded-For), not just body.

References

OWASP Deserialization & XXE cheat sheets; SpEL/OGNL injection research; find-sec-bugs rules.