name: web-pentest description: "Authorized web pentest: recon, proof-based exploits, report." version: 1.0.0 author: Teknium (teknium1), Hermes Agent license: MIT platforms: [linux, macos] category: security triggers:

• "pentest [URL]"
• "pentest this app"
• "penetration test [URL]"
• "security test this web app"
• "test [URL] for vulnerabilities"
• "find vulns in [URL]"
• "OWASP test [URL]"

toolsets:

• terminal
• web
• browser
• file
• delegation

metadata: hermes: tags: [Security, Pentest, Web, Recon] related_skills: []

Web Application Penetration Testing

A phased pentesting workflow for running web applications. Adapted from Shannon's pipeline (Keygraph, AGPL — concepts only, no code borrowed). Built around three rules:

1. No exploit, no report — every finding requires reproducible evidence.
2. Bounded scope — every active request goes against a target the operator

pre-declared. Off-scope hosts are refused.

1. Bypass exhaustion before false-positive dismissal — a "blocked" payload

is not a clean bill of health until you've tried the bypass set.

⚠️ Hard Guardrails — Read Before Every Engagement

Violating any of these invalidates the engagement and may be illegal.

1. Authorization gate. Before the first active scan in a session, you

MUST confirm with the user, in writing, that they own or have written authorization to test the target. Record the acknowledgement in engagement/authorization.md (see template). No acknowledgement → no active scanning. Reading public pages with curl is fine; sending payloads is not.

1. Scope allowlist. Maintain engagement/scope.txt — one hostname or

CIDR per line. Every nmap, curl, whatweb, browser navigation, or payload-bearing request MUST be against an entry in scope. If a target redirects you off-scope (3xx to a different host, a link in HTML), STOP and confirm with the user before following.

1. No production systems without paper. If the user hasn't told you

"yes, prod is in scope and I have written sign-off," assume not. Default targets are staging, local docker, dedicated test instances.

1. Cloud metadata is off by default. Do not probe 169.254.169.254,

metadata.google.internal, 100.100.100.200, [fd00:ec2::254], or equivalent unless the engagement explicitly includes SSRF-to-metadata as a goal AND the target is one you control. The agent's browser tool can reach these from inside your own infrastructure — don't.

1. Destructive payloads need approval. SQLi payloads that DROP/DELETE,

filesystem-write SSTI, command injection with rm/shutdown/mkfs, anything that mutates beyond a single test row → ASK FIRST. The approval.py system catches some; don't rely on it alone.

1. Aux-client leakage risk (Hermes-specific). This skill produces

sessions full of SQLi/XSS/RCE payloads, captured credentials, JWT tokens. Hermes' compression and title-generation paths replay history through the auxiliary client (often the main model). Anything sensitive you write to the conversation can leave the box on the next compress. Mitigation:

• Redact captured tokens/credentials to the LAST 6 CHARS before logging

them in any message. Full values go to engagement/evidence/ files, never into chat history.

• If the engagement is sensitive, set auxiliary.title_generation.enabled: false

in ~/.hermes/config.yaml for the session.

1. Rate limit yourself. Default 200ms between active requests against

any single host. The recon-scan.sh script enforces this. Don't bypass it without operator approval.

1. Authority of the report. This skill produces a security

assessment, not a "PASS." Even a clean run is "no exploitable issues FOUND in scope X within time T using methods Y" — not "the application is secure." Mirror that language in the report.

Phase 0: Engagement Setup

Before any scanning happens, create the engagement directory and authorization acknowledgement.

ENGAGEMENT=engagement-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
mkdir -p "$ENGAGEMENT"/{evidence,findings,reports}
cd "$ENGAGEMENT"

1. Ask the user (verbatim):

> "Confirm: (a) the target URL is [X], (b) you own this application > or have written authorization to test it, and (c) the engagement > may run for up to [N] hours starting now. Reply 'authorized' to > proceed."

1. Wait for explicit `authorized` response. Any other answer means STOP.

1. Record authorization to engagement/authorization.md using the

template in templates/authorization.md. Include:

• Target URL(s) and IP(s)
• Authorization basis (ownership / written authz from $name)
• Engagement window
• Out-of-scope items (production, third-party services, etc.)
• Operator name (the user driving this session)

1. Build scope.txt:

`` localhost 127.0.0.1 staging.example.com 192.168.1.0/24 # internal lab only, with operator OK ``

1. Read references/scope-enforcement.md before issuing the first

active request — that doc has the host-extraction rules you apply to every command/URL before it goes out.

Phase 1: Pre-Recon (Code Analysis, optional)

Skip if no source access (black-box engagement).

If you have read access to the application source:

1. Map the architecture — framework, routing, middleware stack
2. Inventory sinks — every execute(, os.system(, eval(,

template render, file read/write, redirect target

1. Map auth — session cookie vs JWT, OAuth flows, password reset,

privileged endpoints

1. Identify trust boundaries — what's authenticated, what's not,

what comes from request.*

1. Backward taint from each sink to a request source. Early-terminate

when proper sanitization is found (parameterized queries, allowlists, shlex.quote, well-known escapers).

Output: evidence/pre-recon.md — architecture map, sink inventory, suspected vulnerable code paths.

This is OFFLINE work. No traffic to the target.

Phase 2: Recon (Live, Read-Only)

Maps the attack surface. All requests are GETs of public pages, no payloads yet. Still scope-bounded.

1. Verify scope. Resolve every target hostname → IP. Confirm IPs are

in scope (avoids the "DNS points somewhere unexpected" trap).

1. Network surface (only if scope permits port scanning):

``bash nmap -sT -T3 --top-ports 100 -oN evidence/nmap.txt $TARGET ` Use -T3 (default), not -T4/-T5`. Stealthier and avoids tripping IDS/IPS in shared environments.

1. Tech fingerprint:

``bash whatweb -v $TARGET_URL > evidence/whatweb.txt curl -sIk $TARGET_URL > evidence/headers.txt ``

1. Endpoint discovery:

• Crawl the app with the browser tool (browser_navigate,

browser_get_images, follow links).

• Inspect robots.txt, sitemap.xml, .well-known/*.
• Use the developer tools network panel via browser tool to capture

XHR/fetch calls.

1. Auth surface: Identify login, registration, password reset,

session cookie names, token formats. Do NOT send credentials yet — just observe.

1. Correlate with pre-recon (if you have source). For each

evidence/pre-recon.md finding, mark whether the live surface confirms it's reachable.

Output: evidence/recon.md — endpoints, technologies, auth model, input vectors.

Phase 3: Vulnerability Analysis

One delegate_task per vulnerability class. Each agent reads evidence/recon.md (+ evidence/pre-recon.md if present), produces findings/<class>-queue.json using templates/exploitation-queue.json.

Use delegate_task with these focused subagents (parallel where possible):

Each queue entry has: id, vuln class, source (file:line if known), endpoint, parameter, slot type, suspected defense, verdict (identified / partial / confirmed / critical), witness payload, confidence (0-1), notes.

The analysis phase doesn't send malicious payloads yet — it stages them. The exploitation phase actually fires them.

Phase 4: Exploitation (Proof-Based, Conditional)

Only run a sub-agent per class where the analysis queue has actionable entries (identified or partial).

For each candidate:

1. Pre-send check — host in scope? auth gate satisfied? payload

approved if destructive?

1. Send the witness payload — minimal proof. SQLi: ' AND 1=1--

then ' AND 1=2--. XSS: a benign marker like <svg/onload=console.log("HERMES-PENTEST-XSS")>. Never alert(1) in stored XSS — it'll fire for other users in shared environments.

1. Verify the witness fires — for blind injection, use a sleep

probe (SLEEP(5)) and time the response. For SSRF, use a tester-controlled callback host you own (NOT a public service like webhook.site for sensitive engagements — exfil paths).

1. Promote level:

• L1 Identified — pattern matched, no behavior change
• L2 Partial — sink reached, but defense in place
• L3 Confirmed — payload changed app behavior in observable way
• L4 Critical — data extracted, code executed, access escalated

1. Bypass exhaustion before classifying as FP. For each candidate

that blocks: try at least the bypass set in references/bypass-techniques.md for that class. Only after the set is exhausted may you write verdict: false_positive.

1. Record evidence for every L3/L4:

• Full request (method, URL, headers, body)
• Response (status, headers, relevant body excerpt)
• Reproducer command (curl one-liner)
• Impact statement

Output: findings/exploitation-evidence.md

Redact in evidence files:

• Any captured credentials/tokens → last 6 chars only in chat;

full value to findings/secrets-vault.md (gitignored).

• Other users' PII → redact.
• Your test credentials → fine to keep.

Phase 5: Reporting

Generate the final report using templates/pentest-report.md. Sections:

1. Executive summary
2. Engagement scope (from engagement/scope.txt)
3. Authorization (from engagement/authorization.md)
4. Findings (L3/L4 only — proof-required). Per finding:

• Title, severity (CVSS 3.1), CWE
• Affected endpoint(s)
• Proof (request + response excerpt)
• Reproduction steps
• Impact
• Remediation

1. Not-exploited candidates (L1/L2 with notes on what blocked them)
2. Out-of-scope observations
3. Methodology / tools used
4. Limitations and what was NOT tested

Severity policy: CVSS only for L3/L4. L1/L2 are "candidates pending verification" — don't assign CVSS to unverified findings.

When to Stop

• The user revokes authorization.
• A candidate finding clearly impacts production data and you don't have

approval for destructive testing — STOP and ask.

• The target starts returning 503/429 storms — back off, reconvene with

the operator.

• You discover something outside the contracted scope (e.g. an exposed

customer database while testing an unrelated endpoint). STOP, document, report to the operator. Do not pivot without explicit approval — that pivot is what makes pentesting illegal.

What This Skill Does NOT Cover

• Network-layer pentesting beyond port scanning (no Metasploit,

Cobalt Strike, AD attacks, network protocol fuzzing).

• Reverse engineering / binary analysis (see issue #383).
• Source-only static analysis (see issue #382).
• Active social engineering / phishing.
• Anything against systems the operator hasn't pre-authorized.

If the engagement needs any of these, escalate to a professional pentester. This skill complements professional pentesting; it does not replace it.

Further Reading

• references/scope-enforcement.md — how to bound every active request
• references/vuln-taxonomy.md — slot types, render contexts, OWASP map
• references/exploitation-techniques.md — per-class payload patterns
• references/bypass-techniques.md — common WAF/filter bypasses
• templates/authorization.md — engagement authorization template
• templates/pentest-report.md — final report template
• templates/exploitation-queue.json — per-class finding queue schema
• scripts/recon-scan.sh — rate-limited nmap+whatweb+headers wrapper