version: "1.0.1" name: "vault-accounting" description: "Protocol Type Trigger vault (detected in recon TASK 0 Step 1) - Inject Into Core state agent OR economic design agent (merge via M4 hierarchy)"

Injectable Skill: Vault Accounting Correctness

Protocol Type Trigger: vault (detected in recon TASK 0 Step 1)

Inject Into: Core state agent OR economic design agent (merge via M4 hierarchy)

Language: Both EVM and Solana (language-agnostic methodology, language-specific examples omitted)

Finding prefix: [VA-N]

Orchestrator Decomposition Guide

When decomposing this skill into depth agent investigation questions, map sections to domains:

• Sections 1, 4: depth-edge-case (share price boundaries, first depositor)
• Sections 2, 2b: depth-state-trace (time-decay state consistency, anchor timestamps)
• Section 2c: depth-edge-case OR depth-state-trace (reported-vs-held asset divergence at dust supply)
• Sections 3, 5, 5b: depth-token-flow (fee flows, cross-fee ratios, fee solvency)
• Section 6: depth-edge-case OR depth-state-trace (withdrawal fairness)

When This Skill Activates

Recon classifies protocol as vault type based on indicators: deposit/withdraw/shares/strategy/vault. This skill adds vault-specific accounting checks that the general ECONOMIC_DESIGN_AUDIT does not cover.

1. Share Price Consistency Under Adversity

For vault protocols with share-based accounting (LP tokens, vault shares):

Compute share price = total_assets / total_shares at these states:

Tag: [TRACE:state={event} -> share_price={value} -> {expected_or_unexpected}]

2. Time-Decay State Consistency (if applicable)

For vaults with time-decay mechanisms (locked profit, vesting schedules, streaming distributions):

• Identify the BASE variable the decay operates on and the DECAY variable that diminishes over time
• Enumerate ALL state transitions that modify the BASE (profit, loss, deposit, withdrawal, fee harvest)
• For EACH transition: does the DECAY variable adjust accordingly? If BASE decreases but DECAY doesn't → DECAY can exceed BASE
• Does adding new value to the decay (e.g., reporting new profit) reset the timer for ALL remaining decay, or only for the new portion?
• At decay duration = 0: does everything release immediately? At MAX duration?
• After full decay completion: is the decay variable exactly 0, or can dust remain?

Tag: [TRACE:{transition} -> {base_var} changed -> {decay_var} unchanged -> {decay_var} > {base_var} -> {consumer} computes {wrong_result}]

2b. Time-Weighted Anchor Timestamp Validation

For time-weighted calculations (fees, vesting, rewards) that use a (value × timeDelta) formula:

1. Identify the ANCHOR timestamp (e.g., lastDistributionTime (vesting vaults), periodFinish/lastUpdateTime (Synthetix-style staking), lastFeeCollection (management fee), lastStreamUpdate (streaming))
2. Trace ALL functions that START a new time-weighted period (e.g., distributeYield/updateSharePrice (vesting vaults), notifyRewardAmount (Synthetix), reportProfit/report (Yearn-style), startNewEpoch (epoch-based))
3. For each: does it update the anchor timestamp to block.timestamp (or now) UNCONDITIONALLY, or only inside a conditional block?
4. If the anchor is NOT updated when a new period starts: timeDelta in the next calculation will include time from BEFORE the new period, causing accelerated vesting/fee accrual
5. Test: what happens if the anchor timestamp is 7 days stale when a new period of 7 days starts? fraction = 7d/(7d+7d) = 50% vests immediately instead of 0%

Tag: [TRACE:new_period_start → anchor_timestamp NOT updated → timeDelta includes {stale_duration} → {acceleration_factor}x acceleration]

2c. Reported-vs-Held Asset Divergence at Dust Supply

For any accounting getter intentionally OVERRIDDEN to diverge from the real held balance (excluding an unvested/streaming/pending component):

1. Determine whether its output can INCREASE purely from elapsed time (vesting) with no deposit/withdraw/donation event.
2. If yes, at every window where totalSupply is zero or dust while that divergence is closing, compute shares = deposit * totalSupply / reportedAssets() with real constants for a minimal deposit — does round-down zero/critically dilute the depositor because reported-assets rose ahead of supply?
3. Treat as a first-depositor/inflation-family finding whose value-injection trigger is the protocol's OWN accounting formula (time-based vesting), not an external donation — check the HARM in the depositor-LOSES direction, not only the attacker-profits direction of ZERO_STATE_RETURN §2a.

Tag: [TRACE:reportedAssets() rises via vesting_elapsed → totalSupply=dust → shares=deposit*totalSupply/reportedAssets() rounds down → depositor loses principal]

3. Cross-Fee Ratio Dependency (if applicable)

For vaults where one fee type changes a ratio that another fee type reads:

• For each fee type, trace whether applying it changes the canonical assets/shares ratio
• Map fee→ratio→fee chains: if fee A changes the ratio and fee B uses that ratio as input, compute the combined effective rate
• For ratio-threshold mechanisms (e.g., high water marks, performance benchmarks): does any fee or state change shift the ratio without representing actual protocol performance?
• For ratio snapshots: after a negative event (loss, slashing), does the snapshot become permanently stale? Is there a reset or recalibration path?

4. First Depositor / Dead Weight / Re-entry

• Is there first-depositor protection (minimum deposit, virtual shares, burned initial shares)?
• After all users exit (return to zero): does the protection re-activate?
• Can residual dust/fees create an exploitable state for the next depositor?

5. Fee Source Analysis

For each fee accumulator (platform fees, performance fees, management fees, yield fees):

1. Trace the fee claim path: does claimFees() transfer vault assets out, or mint new tokens to the fee recipient?
2. If vault assets are transferred out: are corresponding shares burned to maintain the assets-per-share ratio? If NO → fees dilute existing shareholders (share-backed liability). Flag as finding.
3. If new shares are minted to the fee recipient: does the mint inflate total supply without adding assets? If YES → same dilution effect. Flag as finding.
4. Assess whether the dilution is documented/intended (management fee model) vs undocumented/surprising to depositors.

5b. Fee Solvency Under Stress

For each fee accumulator identified in section 5:

1. Trace total accrued fees (feeAccumulator or equivalent) across a sequence: deposit → yield → loss → yield → fee claim
2. Verify: can accrued fees exceed the vault's actual available assets? If fees are computed on a snapshot (e.g., lastRecordedSupply × sharePrice × timeDelta) and the snapshot is NOT reduced by loss events, fees accumulate on phantom assets
3. Check: does the fee calculation use min(currentSupply, lastUpdateSupply) or equivalent conservative bounding? If YES, verify the lastUpdateSupply is updated on ALL paths (deposit, withdrawal, loss, yield)
4. If fees can exceed vault solvency → FINDING: fee solvency gap under stress
5. Fee base amplification: Trace whether the fee calculation base (e.g., totalAssets, sharePrice, exchangeRate) can be INFLATED by a preceding operation in the same transaction or administrative sequence. Pattern: admin resets a high-water mark or benchmark → fee base recalculates from a lower reference → next yield event charges fees on phantom gains that were previously below the benchmark. Check: does the fee base track CUMULATIVE gain or INCREMENTAL gain since last collection? If cumulative: can any reset/recalibration cause double-counting?

5c. Fee Extraction vs Exchange Rate Consistency

For each fee claim path identified in section 5:

1. Are accrued fees subtracted from the exchange rate / share price BEFORE the fee claim transfers assets out? If fees inflate the exchange rate but are then extracted without deflating it → last redeemer insolvency
2. If vault assets are deployed externally (strategies, lending, bridges): does the fee claim path verify sufficient liquid reserves? If fees are claimable against the full balance but assets are illiquid → fee claim can drain liquid reserves below withdrawal needs

Tag: [TRACE:loss_event → fee_base_unchanged → feesOwed > available_assets → {impact}]

6. Withdrawal Fairness Under Stress

• If withdrawal is multi-step (request -> wait -> execute): can vault conditions change between steps?
• Are withdrawal amounts computed at request time or execution time?
• Can a large withdrawal request starve subsequent requestors?

Step Execution Checklist