version: "1.0.0" name: dependency-mapping description: > Produces a dependency map for a service architecture — a dependency matrix (who calls whom, sync/async, hard/soft), a blast-radius analysis per service, single points of failure, a graceful- degradation inventory, and recommendations to reduce blast radius. Use when the user says "map our dependencies", "if X goes down what breaks", "find our SPOFs", "blast radius", or lists services and their connections. Use this to understand failure propagation across services; use scalability-assessment for capacity-under-load rather than failure-propagation.

Dependency Mapping

Document which services depend on which, what happens when each fails, and the blast radius of every service — so the architecture can answer "if service X goes down, what breaks?"

Inputs to gather

Gather these before mapping. If any are missing, ask in a single batched question — never invent dependencies, criticality, or incident history. Mark anything genuinely unavailable as Unknown in the output.

• Services — the service list with one-line descriptions
• Known dependencies — who calls whom, sync vs async, external dependencies
• Recent incidents — outages caused by dependencies (these reveal real blast radius)

Steps

1. Confirm inputs. If the dependency relationships aren't given, ask — the map is only as good as the dependency facts. Mark unverified edges Unknown.
2. Build the Dependency matrix — for each service: what it depends on, sync vs async, and criticality (hard = caller fails without it; soft = caller degrades but survives). Include external dependencies (Stripe, SendGrid, etc.).
3. Do the Blast radius analysis — for each service: what breaks if it goes down, the share of users affected, and the business impact. Use any cited incidents as ground truth ("proven in the Feb outage").
4. Identify the Single points of failure — services that, if down, take everything down. Name them explicitly; these are the priorities.
5. Build the Graceful degradation inventory — per dependency: does a fallback exist, and what is the behaviour when it's down? Be honest where no fallback exists.
6. Write Recommendations — architectural changes to reduce blast radius, prioritised toward the SPOFs and the dependencies with no fallback (e.g. a short-lived auth-token cache at the gateway, a degraded-mode search fallback).
7. Adapt to context: offer to render the matrix as an actual diagram (Mermaid) — visual dependencies are easier to scan than tables. If the team has a service mesh or APM, recommend generating the map from real traffic rather than manual documentation, which drifts. For a non-engineer audience, relabel services as business capabilities ("Auth service" → "Login system"). Note that this document is most useful kept bookmarked for incident response ("what else might be broken?").
8. Assemble the output in the format below.

Output format

**Dependency Map: [Architecture]**
 
**Dependency Matrix**
| Service | Depends On | Type | Criticality |
|---------|-----------|------|-------------|
 
**Blast Radius Analysis**
| If This Goes Down | What Breaks | Users Affected | Business Impact |
|-------------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|
 
**Single Points of Failure**
1. [Service] — [why no fallback]
 
**Graceful Degradation Inventory**
| Dependency | Fallback Exists? | Behaviour When Down |
|-----------|------------------|---------------------|
 
**Recommendations**
1. [Change → blast radius it reduces]

Boundaries

• Never fabricate dependency edges, criticality, or incident history — mark unverified relationships Unknown; a wrong map is worse than an honest gap.
• Never label a dependency "soft" without confirming the fallback actually exists and works — overstating resilience is dangerous in an incident.
• Never omit external dependencies (payment, email, third-party APIs) — they are common blast-radius sources outside your control.
• Manual maps drift — flag that the map should be regenerated from real traffic where tooling allows.

Chaining

• After this, offer runbook-generator (incident-management) to turn each SPOF and degradation gap into an actionable runbook, or incident-commander-runbook to prepare response for the highest-blast-radius services.
• The recommendations also feed back into system-design-document when re-architecting to remove a SPOF.