sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/evidence-hygiene

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Evidence-capture and PoC-redaction discipline for bug-bounty submissions

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npx vskill@latest install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/evidence-hygiene

SKILL.md

EVIDENCE HYGIENE — PoC Capture & Redaction Discipline

Use this skill BEFORE capturing any screenshot, exporting any HAR, or attaching any evidence to a bug-bounty submission. It catches the most common evidence-hygiene mistakes that cause cookies to leak, PII to be shared without consent, or screenshots to be unsuitable for triage.

The core principle: Bug-bounty evidence is meant to convince a triager. Anything beyond that — live cookies, real-user PII, internal trace IDs that aren't useful — should not be in the evidence.


1. Sensitive Data Categories of Sensitive Data

Every PoC artifact (screenshot, HAR, raw HTTP request, terminal transcript) potentially contains data that needs different treatment.

CategoryExamplesTreatment
Your-account secretsSession cookies, OAuth tokens, refresh tokens, API keysAlways redact. Even in private bug-bounty platform attachments. Your account, your session — protect it.
Other users' PIIReal names, emails, phone numbers, addresses, profile photos, account IDsRedact unless explicitly demonstrating cross-account impact. Even then, mask faces and minimize the data you display.
Triager-useful metadataTrace IDs (x-datadog-trace-id), request IDs, server timestamps, your test account UID/email, GraphQL operation names, response shapesReview and minimize — selected nonsecret values help the triager correlate to logs and reproduce.
Test-account passwords (limited use)Throwaway passwords on a test account (e.g., Testing@5678)Redact passwords before sharing, including throwaway accounts. Rotate/revoke any exposed value; do not rely on later rotation to justify disclosure.

2. Cookie Redaction Protocol

2.1 What must be masked

The session cookie value is the highest-value secret in any PoC. Mask:

  • The session cookie (authn, session, sid, __Secure-id, etc. — name varies per target)
  • csrf-token if it's bound to your session
  • Authorization headers (Bearer tokens, JWT)
  • Cookie request header values for any session-bearing cookie
  • Set-Cookie response header values for any session-bearing cookie
2.2 What's safe to leave visible
  • Cookie NAMES and attributes can remain; redact all cookie values by default, including bot-management and analytics identifiers
  • Analytics ID names, with values masked unless needed and approved
  • Trace correlation IDs (x-datadog-trace-id, x-request-id)
  • Server / framework headers (Server: cloudflare, X-Frame-Options)
  • Your test account email/UID (per Bugcrowdninja alias section in bugcrowd-reporting)
2.3 Redaction methods (ranked by practicality)

Method A — Don't capture the cookies in the first place (preferred when possible)

  • For DevTools Console PoCs: use credentials: 'include' so the browser sends cookies automatically. Console output won't echo the cookie. Screenshot the Console output, never the Network tab Headers panel.
  • For Burp Repeater PoCs: drag the bottom request/response panel divider DOWN to hide the request body before screenshotting. Capture only the Results table for Intruder runs.

Method B — Destructive redaction on a flattened copy (when capture includes cookies)

  • An editable rectangle overlay may be removable. Export a new flattened raster, strip metadata, reopen it and verify pixels/OCR at full resolution; never attach the editable original.
  • macOS: Open screenshot in Preview → Tools → Annotate → Rectangle → set fill color to black → drag rectangle over the cookie value → save
  • Windows: Use Snip & Sketch's annotation tools or any image editor (Paint.NET, etc.)
  • Redact a COPY of captured evidence offline; do not alter live Proxy Match and Replace rules merely to sanitize a screenshot, since they can change requests and invalidate reproduction.

Method C — Find/replace in raw text (for HAR files, terminal transcripts)

  • See §4 for the jq commands
2.4 Pre-screenshot checklist

Before clicking Capture:

[ ] Network tab Headers panel is collapsed or out of frame
[ ] Burp's Request panel is hidden behind the divider drag
[ ] No "Copy as cURL" output is visible on screen
[ ] DevTools Application → Storage → Cookies tab is closed
[ ] Browser URL bar doesn't show a session token in query string (rare but possible)

After capturing:

[ ] Open the screenshot at full resolution before saving
[ ] Search for the session cookie name substring in any visible text — if present, redact
[ ] Search for the literal first 6 chars of your cookie value — if present, redact
[ ] Compare to the previous PoC screenshot in the same engagement — same redaction discipline

3. PII Black-Bar Protocol

When a PoC necessarily exposes another user's data (e.g., demonstrating IDOR by showing the victim's email in an attacker-session response), redact the actual PII even in private attachments.

3.1 What to mask (other-user data)
  • First name, last name (full or partial)
  • Email address (mask the local part; can leave domain if non-identifying)
  • Phone number (mask the last 7 digits, optionally leave country code)
  • Physical address (mask everything below city)
  • Date of birth (mask the year, optionally the month)
  • Government IDs (SSN, passport — mask everything)
  • Profile photos / face images (black-bar the face entirely)
  • Account IDs that the user could correlate to public profiles
3.2 What to leave visible (proves the bug, not the user)
  • The fact that the field was returned (the JSON key name)
  • The shape / type of the field ("first_name": "<REDACTED>")
  • Your own (attacker session's) UID / email — this proves cross-account
  • The endpoint URL and request method
  • The trace ID
3.3 Worked example — IDOR PoC body

Bad (leaks victim's full PII):

json
{"data":{"contact":{"first_name":"Nadene","last_name":"Afton","email":"nadene.afton@example.com","phone":"+1-555-867-5309"}}}

Good (proves the bug, masks the PII):

json
{"data":{"contact":{"first_name":"<REDACTED — real first name>","last_name":"<REDACTED — real last name>","email":"<REDACTED>@example.com","phone":"<REDACTED>"}}}

In screenshot form, black-bar each value with a rectangle annotation labeled "REAL PII REDACTED" if there's space.

3.4 In the report body

Reference the redaction explicitly:

markdown
## Proof of Concept
The screenshot below demonstrates the IDOR. The attacker session (uid 12345678) successfully retrieves the victim's profile data (uid 99887766). **Real PII fields in the response are masked with black rectangles to limit unauthorized exposure of victim data, per responsible-disclosure hygiene.** Use controlled test-account data where possible. Additional evidence requires separate minimization and an approved secure channel.

This signals the triager that you're disciplined and gives them a clear path to the unredacted version if they need it for verification.


4. HAR File Sanitization

HAR (HTTP Archive) files are JSON dumps of network traffic with full request/response bodies and headers. They include cookies, auth tokens, and any PII that was in transit.

4.1 Generate the HAR

Chrome DevTools → Network tab → right-click anywhere in the request list → "Save all as HAR with content"

4.2 Sanitize before attaching

Use jq to strip sensitive headers. Save this as a shell function or one-liner you can re-use:

bash
sanitize_har() {
local input="$1"
local output="${1%.har}.metadata-only.json"
# This is deliberately NOT a full sanitized HAR: bodies/URLs/headers are omitted.
# Treat retained MIME strings as untrusted and inspect the output before sharing.
(umask 077; set -o noclobber
jq '{entries: [.log.entries[] | {
method: .request.method,
status: .response.status,
mimeType: .response.content.mimeType
}]}' "$input" > "$output") || return 1
printf 'Created metadata-only extract; review privately before sharing: %s\n' "$output"
}

Usage:

bash
sanitize_har /path/to/exported.har
# Output: /path/to/exported.sanitized.har
4.3 Verify before attaching

A header-only filter does not sanitize HAR: credentials/PII can occur in URLs, queryString, postData, response bodies (including base64), cookies and extensions. Prefer a minimal allowlisted extract. If a full HAR is essential, review every retained field offline with a schema-aware tool and approved redaction list; scan for known secret fingerprints without printing their values. Keep originals in an encrypted restricted store with a defined retention window and disclose only the minimum separately approved evidence. Regex replacement alone cannot certify it.


5. Burp Suite Screenshot Hygiene

5.1 Repeater (single request demo)
  1. In the Repeater request panel, the Cookie header is on its own line — drag the panel divider DOWN to hide everything below the request line / target line
  2. Or: temporarily delete the Cookie header text from the Repeater pane (it doesn't affect the original captured request) before screenshotting, then restore
  3. Capture only the response panel (right side) showing the JSON / HTML response that demonstrates the bug
5.2 Intruder Results table (rate-limit / brute-force demos)

The Results window is the strongest evidence for rate-limit findings. To capture cleanly:

  1. After the attack finishes, drag the horizontal divider between the Results table and the Request/Response panels DOWN, until only the Results table is visible
  2. Screenshot only the columns: Request#, Payload, Status code, Response received, Length
  3. Don't include the Request / Response sub-panels — they contain the cookie
5.3 Proxy HTTP history (capture demo)

Almost never the right screenshot — it shows entire request/response pairs with cookies. Use Repeater for demos instead.

5.4 Scanner findings (if applicable)

The Scanner tab's Issues panel may contain sensitive URLs/evidence; inspect it before screenshotting — it shows finding summaries without the underlying request bodies. Click into a specific finding before screenshotting only if you've redacted its evidence first.


6. Chrome DevTools Console PoC Patterns

6.1 The clean-PoC pattern
js
fetch('/api/endpoint', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'content-type': 'application/json'},
credentials: 'include', // sends cookies automatically — they won't appear in your code
body: JSON.stringify({ /* your payload */ })
}).then(r => r.json()).then(j => console.log("LABEL:", {hasData: !!j.data}))

Why this is clean:

  • credentials: 'include' means the browser sends cookies. Your code never references them. They never appear in screenshots.
  • console.log("LABEL:", ...) produces a labeled output line you can search for in the screenshot
  • Log only explicitly allowlisted nonsecret fields; automatic JSON dumps can expose credentials and PII
6.2 Multi-step PoCs (clear console between calls)

For a 4-step PoC (verify before / change / verify after / revert), clear the console between calls so each screenshot only shows ONE call and ONE response:

  • Mac: Cmd+K
  • Windows / Linux: Ctrl+L

Take the screenshot immediately after the response prints — don't wait for unrelated framework warnings to appear.

6.3 Long responses (truncate for screenshot)

If the response body is too long for a clean screenshot, log a summary instead:

js
fetch('/api/endpoint', { /* ... */ })
.then(r => r.json())
.then(j => {
console.log("RESPONSE SHAPE:", Object.keys(j.data || {}));
console.log("FIELD PRESENCE:", {hasEmail: typeof j.data?.email === 'string'});
// (Don't dump the full j — your screenshot becomes unreadable)
})
6.4 Console execution boundary

This is the start of the file. Read the full SKILL.md on GitHub.

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