sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/model-supply-chain-security

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Secure the AI model supply chain with artifact signing, provenance attestation,

Install

npx vskill@latest install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/model-supply-chain-security

SKILL.md

Model Supply Chain Security

Protect models and inference components from tampering, dependency compromise, and untrusted artifact promotion.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

  • Pulling pretrained models from public registries (Hugging Face, TensorFlow Hub)
  • Building model-serving containers for production deployment
  • Establishing trust policies for ML artifact promotion across environments
  • Responding to supply chain incidents affecting ML dependencies
  • Meeting SLSA or SOC2 compliance requirements for AI systems

Prerequisites

  • cosign v2+ installed for signing and verification
  • syft for SBOM generation of model-serving images
  • crane or skopeo for OCI image inspection
  • Container registry with signature support (GHCR, ECR, ACR, Artifact Registry)
  • CI/CD pipeline with provenance generation capability

Threats

  • Poisoned pretrained weights or adapters
  • Malicious model conversion tools or loaders
  • Compromised build pipelines and registries
  • Insecure runtime images with critical CVEs
  • Typosquatting on model registries
  • Deserialization attacks via pickle or custom loaders

Control Objectives

  • Verify artifact integrity end-to-end
  • Prove provenance for every promoted model
  • Detect vulnerable dependencies before deploy
  • Restrict execution to trusted signed artifacts

Model Signing with Cosign

Sign a Model Artifact
bash
# Generate a keypair (store private key securely)
cosign generate-key-pair
# Sign an OCI-packaged model image
cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Keyless signing with Sigstore (uses OIDC identity)
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Verify the signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Keyless verification (requires certificate identity)
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
Sign Model Weight Files Directly
bash
# For model files stored as blobs (not OCI images)
# Compute digest and sign
sha256sum model-weights.safetensors > model-weights.sha256
cosign sign-blob --key cosign.key model-weights.safetensors \
--output-signature model-weights.sig \
--output-certificate model-weights.crt
# Verify blob signature
cosign verify-blob --key cosign.pub \
--signature model-weights.sig \
model-weights.safetensors

SLSA for ML Pipelines

SLSA Level Requirements for Model Builds
yaml
# slsa-requirements.yaml
slsa_levels:
level_1:
- Build process is scripted (not manual)
- Provenance document generated automatically
level_2:
- Build runs on hosted CI service
- Provenance is authenticated (signed)
- Source is version controlled
level_3:
- Build environment is ephemeral and isolated
- Provenance is non-falsifiable (hardened builder)
- Source integrity verified (two-person review)
Generate SLSA Provenance for Model Training
yaml
# .github/workflows/model-build-slsa.yml
name: Model Build with SLSA Provenance
on:
push:
tags: ['model-v*']
jobs:
train-and-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
packages: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Train model
run: python train.py --config configs/production.yaml
- name: Package model as OCI artifact
run: |
oras push ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }} \
model-weights.safetensors:application/vnd.acme.model.safetensors \
model-config.json:application/json
- name: Generate SBOM for training environment
run: |
syft dir:. -o cyclonedx-json > training-sbom.json
- name: Sign and attest
run: |
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}
cosign attest --predicate training-sbom.json \
--type cyclonedx \
ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}
# Provenance must be generated by a supported reusable workflow invoked at jobs.<job>.uses,
# not as a step. Add a separate dependent job with the actual immutable digest output
# from an identified push step and the selected generator's required inputs.

Model Cards for Provenance

yaml
# model-card.yaml
model_details:
name: "sentiment-classifier-v2.1.0"
version: "2.1.0"
type: "text-classification"
framework: "pytorch"
license: "Apache-2.0"
provenance:
training_data:
source: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-v3/"
hash: "sha256:abc123..."
data_card_ref: "https://internal.acme.com/data-cards/sentiment-v3"
training_config:
source: "git://github.com/acme/ml-models@abc123"
hyperparameters:
learning_rate: 0.00005
epochs: 10
batch_size: 32
build_environment:
builder: "github-actions"
runner: "ubuntu-22.04"
python: "3.11.7"
torch: "2.1.2"
cuda: "12.1"
build_id: "gh-actions-12345"
commit_sha: "abc123def456"
build_timestamp: "2025-01-15T10:30:00Z"
signed_by: "ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
performance:
accuracy: 0.94
f1_score: 0.93
evaluation_dataset: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-eval-v3/"
evaluation_hash: "sha256:def456..."
security:
vulnerability_scan: "clean"
sbom_ref: "ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0.sbom"
last_security_review: "2025-01-10"
known_limitations:
- "May produce biased outputs for underrepresented languages"
- "Not evaluated for adversarial robustness"

Registry Scanning

bash
# Scan model-serving image for CVEs
trivy image ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0
# Generate SBOM for the serving container
syft ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0 -o spdx-json > serving-sbom.json
# Scan SBOM for vulnerabilities
grype sbom:serving-sbom.json --fail-on critical
# Check for known-malicious model files (pickle scanning)
pip install fickling
fickling --check model.pkl
Automated Registry Scan Pipeline
yaml
# .github/workflows/registry-scan.yml
name: Nightly Registry Scan
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
matrix:
image:
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:latest
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/embedding-serving:latest
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/rag-api:latest
steps:
- name: Scan image
run: |
trivy image --severity CRITICAL,HIGH \
--exit-code 1 \
--format json \
--output scan-$(echo ${{ matrix.image }} | tr '/:' '-').json \
${{ matrix.image }}
- name: Verify signatures are still valid
run: |
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
${{ matrix.image }}

Promotion Policy Enforcement

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""model_promotion_gate.py - Verify model meets all promotion criteria."""
import subprocess
import json
import sys
def check_signature(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify", "--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_vulnerabilities(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["trivy", "image", "--severity", "CRITICAL", "--exit-code", "1",
"--quiet", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_sbom_exists(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "cyclonedx",
"--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_model_card(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "custom",
"--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def main():
image = sys.argv[1]
checks = {
"signature_valid": check_signature(image),
"no_critical_cves": check_vulnerabilities(image),
"sbom_attached": check_sbom_exists(image),
"model_card_present": check_model_card(image),
}
all_passed = all(checks.values())
for name, passed in checks.items():
status = "PASS" if passed else "FAIL"
print(f" [{status}] {name}")
if not all_passed:
print("Promotion BLOCKED: not all checks passed.")
sys.exit(1)
print("Illustrative checks passed; policy/content validation and authorized promotion still required.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

Runtime Hardening

  • Run inference containers as non-root.
  • Apply egress restrictions to prevent unauthorized downloads.
  • Mount model volumes read-only when possible.
  • Alert on unsigned artifact pull attempts.
  • Prefer safetensors weights to avoid pickle execution during weight decoding; custom model code, dependencies and parsers still require review.
yaml
# kubernetes deployment hardening
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: model-serving
spec:
template:
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
containers:
- name: inference
image: ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0
securityContext:
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumeMounts:
- name: model-weights
mountPath: /models
readOnly: true
resources:
limits:
memory: "4Gi"
nvidia.com/gpu: "1"
volumes:
- name: model-weights
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: model-weights-pvc
readOnly: true

Kyverno Policy for Admission Control

yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-signed-model-images
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
rules:
- name: verify-model-image-signature
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
namespaces: ["ml-serving"]
verifyImages:
- imageReferences: ["ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/*"]
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
issuer: "https://accounts.google.com"

Troubleshooting

This is the start of the file. Read the full SKILL.md on GitHub.

Security

  • Security scanPassed, 100 of 100Pattern checks on the skill's files.
  • Model reviewNot runA model review is scheduled for the next rescan.

Quality evaluation

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Source

Popularity

Repository stars
47,061
Repository forks
6,855
7-day trend score
54

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