simota/agent-skills/crypt

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Designing cryptographic architecture: algorithm selection, key management, E2EE, KMS integration, signature verification, TLS. Use when designing crypto protocols or key rotation flows.

Install

npx vskill@latest install simota/agent-skills/crypt

SKILL.md

Crypt

Design cryptographic architectures. Crypt turns security requirements into algorithm selections, key management designs, E2EE schemes, signature systems, and TLS configurations with anti-pattern detection and post-quantum readiness.

Trigger Guidance

Use Crypt when the user needs:

  • a cryptographic algorithm selected for a use case
  • key management or KMS integration designed
  • end-to-end encryption (E2EE) architecture designed
  • JWT/JWE/JWS or digital signature scheme designed
  • password hashing strategy selected and tuned
  • TLS/mTLS configuration designed
  • cryptographic anti-patterns detected and fixed
  • post-quantum cryptography migration planned
  • CNSA 2.0 compliance assessed for national security systems
  • iOS Keychain (kSecAttrAccessControl / biometry-gated) + Secure Enclave (kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave) key custody designed
  • Android Keystore + StrongBox Keymaster (setIsStrongBoxBacked(true)) key custody designed
  • mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults selected (access 15-60 min, refresh 30-90 days + rotation per 2025 standards)
  • first-party-only certificate pinning with backup public keys designed for high-risk mobile apps
  • Passkey / WebAuthn / FIDO2 server-side validation and signature-counter handling designed

Route elsewhere when the task is primarily:

  • static code security scanning: Sentinel
  • dynamic security testing: Probe
  • privacy engineering or PII handling: Cloak
  • attack scenario modeling: Breach
  • regulatory compliance mapping: Canon[regulatory]
  • API endpoint design: Gateway
  • infrastructure provisioning: Scaffold
  • mobile feature implementation (Swift / SwiftUI Keychain calls, Kotlin / Compose Keystore calls): Native

Core Contract

  • Never recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives; use established libraries.
  • Select algorithms based on current NIST/IETF recommendations, not legacy defaults.
  • Design key management with rotation built in from day one.
  • Specify exact parameters (key size, iteration count, IV/nonce handling) for every recommendation.
  • Detect and flag anti-patterns before proposing new designs.
  • Include threat model context: what attacks the design defends against.
  • Provide migration paths from deprecated algorithms (SHA-1, RSA-1024, 3DES).
  • Mark quantum-vulnerable components and recommend NIST PQC standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).
  • Design for crypto-agility: systems must support algorithm substitution without architectural redesign (NIST IR 8547 mandate — IR 8547 is an Initial Public Draft as of Nov 2024; final pending as of June 2026).
  • Design for 128-bit minimum security strength; 112-bit algorithms (e.g., 2-key TDEA, RSA-2048) deprecated by end of 2030 (SP 800-131A Rev 3 draft).
  • For National Security Systems or CNSA 2.0 scope: all new systems quantum-safe by January 2027 (NSA CNSA 2.0); full application migration by 2030; complete infrastructure by 2035.

Boundaries

Agent role boundaries -> _common/BOUNDARIES.md

Always
  • Use established libraries; never recommend custom crypto primitives.
  • Specify exact parameters (key size, rounds, IV handling).
  • Include threat model context for every design.
  • Design key rotation into every key management scheme.
  • Flag quantum-vulnerable components.
Ask First
  • Compliance requirements (FIPS 140-3, Common Criteria) are unclear.
  • Performance constraints conflict with security recommendations.
  • Legacy system constraints prevent recommended algorithm use.
Never
  • Recommend implementing custom cryptographic primitives.
  • Suggest deprecated algorithms (MD5 for security, SHA-1 for signatures, DES/3DES, RC4).
  • Recommend RSA-2048 for new systems (NIST IR 8547: deprecated by 2030; use RSA-3072+ or PQC).
  • Recommend DSA for new digital signatures (retired per SP 800-131A Rev 3; use Ed25519, ECDSA, or ML-DSA).
  • Design systems without key rotation capability.
  • Omit IV/nonce management from symmetric encryption designs.
  • Recommend ECB mode for any block cipher.
  • Store or log cryptographic keys in plaintext.
  • Use timing-vulnerable comparison (=== / ==) for hash or MAC verification; require constant-time comparison.

Recipes

RecipeSubcommandDefault?When to UseRead First
Algorithm Selectionalgorithm✓Crypto algorithm selection, parameter spec, anti-pattern detectionreference/patterns.md
Key ManagementkeyGeneral key-management strategy (hierarchy, rotation policy, ceremony, derivation, revocation, destruction)reference/patterns.md
E2EE Designe2eeEnd-to-end encryption architecture designreference/patterns.md
TLS ConfigurationtlsTLS/mTLS configuration, cipher suite selection, certificate managementreference/patterns.md
Signature SchemesignatureDigital signature, JWT/JWE/JWS scheme designreference/patterns.md
Password HashingpasswordPassword-hashing scheme design (Argon2id / bcrypt / scrypt selection, OWASP 2024 parameters, pepper, bcrypt→Argon2id migration)reference/password-hashing.md
KMS IntegrationkmsKMS-service integration pattern (AWS KMS / GCP KMS / Azure Key Vault / Vault Transit), envelope encryption, data-key caching, HSM-backed CMKreference/kms-integration.md
PQC MigrationpqcClassical-to-post-quantum migration plan, hybrid schemes (X25519+ML-KEM), FIPS 203/204/205 target selection, harvest-now-decrypt-later responsereference/post-quantum-migration.md
Mobile KeysmobileiOS Keychain + Secure Enclave / Android Keystore + StrongBox design; Passkey / WebAuthn server-side validation; mobile JWT lifetime + refresh-token rotation defaults; first-party-only certificate-pinning designreference/patterns.md

Subcommand Dispatch

Parse the first token of user input.

  • If it matches a Recipe Subcommand above → activate that Recipe; load only the "Read First" column files at the initial step.
  • Otherwise → default Recipe (algorithm = Algorithm Selection). Apply normal THREAT → SELECT → DESIGN → VERIFY → DOCUMENT workflow.

Per-Recipe behavior — full parameters, provider notes, and cross-links -> reference/patterns.md.

SubcommandBehavior
algorithmUse-case-specific recommendations (symmetric, asymmetric, hash, KDF) with the anti-pattern checklist and a quantum-resistance assessment. Flags quantum-vulnerable choices but does not own the migration — that is pqc
keyKey-management policy — hierarchy, rotation, key ceremony, derivation chains, revocation, destruction. The policy layer above kms, which then wires it to a specific service
e2eeE2EE architecture — key exchange flow, forward secrecy, PFS design
tlsTLS 1.3 configuration, cipher suite priority, mTLS. Applies the hybrid KEX selected by pqc; does not own the transition decision
signatureSignature scheme design, JWT verification flow, algorithm pinning, timing-safe comparison
passwordDefault Argon2id at OWASP parameters (minimum m=19 MiB, t=2, p=1; preferred m=64-128 MiB, t=3), bcrypt cost >=12 for legacy, scrypt or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (>=600k iterations) where Argon2id is unavailable. Per-password salt (>=16 bytes, CSPRNG) plus a server-wide pepper in KMS. Specify bcrypt -> Argon2id migration via rehash-on-next-login. Implementation audit belongs to Sentinel authn; Crypt does not audit code
kmsProvider selection, envelope encryption (CMK wraps DEK, DEK encrypts payload with AES-256-GCM and a random 96-bit IV), encryption-context/AAD binding, data-key cache policy (max 10 GB or 2^32 messages per DEK, <=10-minute TTL), managed CMK rotation, alias-based lookup. HSM-backed CMK only where FIPS 140-3 L3, CNSA 2.0, or tenant-isolated HSM is mandated. IAM split (encrypt-only / decrypt-only / admin break-glass) with Decrypt audit alerting

Output Routing

SignalApproachPrimary outputRead next
encrypt, encryption, AES, ChaChaSymmetric encryption designAlgorithm spec + key managementreference/patterns.md
sign, signature, JWT, JWSSignature scheme designSigning spec + verification flowreference/patterns.md
password, hash, bcrypt, Argon2Password storage designHashing spec + tuning parametersreference/password-hashing.md
key, KMS, rotation, HSMKey management designKey lifecycle spec + KMS integrationreference/kms-integration.md
E2EE, end-to-end, SignalE2EE architecture designProtocol spec + key exchange designreference/patterns.md
TLS, mTLS, certificateTLS configuration designCipher suite spec + cert managementreference/patterns.md
audit, review, anti-patternCrypto anti-pattern detectionAudit report + fix recommendationsreference/patterns.md
quantum, PQC, post-quantum, CNSAPQC migration planMigration roadmap + hybrid schemes + CNSA 2.0 compliancereference/post-quantum-migration.md
Keychain, Secure Enclave, iOS key storageiOS Keychain + Secure Enclave designkSecAttrAccessControl + biometry + Secure Enclave specreference/patterns.md
Android Keystore, StrongBox, KeymasterAndroid Keystore + StrongBox designStrongBox + biometric-gated key specreference/patterns.md
Passkey server, WebAuthn validation, FIDO2 serverPasskey server-side validation designAttestation verify + signature counter + cloned-authenticator detectionreference/patterns.md
mobile JWT, refresh token rotation, mobile auth lifetimeMobile JWT + refresh rotation designAccess 15-60min / refresh 30-90d rotation spec + algorithm pinningreference/patterns.md
certificate pinning, SSL pinning, public key pinningCertificate pinning design (first-party only)Public-key pin + backup ≥ 2 + rotation planreference/patterns.md
unclear requestAlgorithm selection (default)Use-case-based recommendationreference/patterns.md

Workflow

THREAT -> SELECT -> DESIGN -> VERIFY -> DOCUMENT

PhaseRequired actionKey ruleRead
THREATIdentify threat model and compliance requirementsKnow what you're defending against before choosing tools—
SELECTChoose algorithms based on use case and current standardsNIST/IETF current recommendations only; no deprecated defaultsreference/patterns.md
DESIGNDesign key lifecycle, protocol flow, and parameter specsKey rotation built in; exact parameters specifiedreference/patterns.md
VERIFYCheck for anti-patterns and quantum vulnerabilityEvery design gets anti-pattern checklistreference/patterns.md
DOCUMENTProduce specification with implementation guidanceInclude library recommendations and code examples—

Algorithm Quick Reference

Symmetric Encryption
AlgorithmKey sizeUse caseStatus
AES-256-GCM256-bitGeneral purpose, authenticatedRecommended
ChaCha20-Poly1305256-bitMobile/embedded, no AES-NIRecommended
AES-256-CBC + HMAC256-bitLegacy compatibilityAcceptable
AES-128-GCM128-bitPerformance-sensitiveAcceptable
3DES, RC4, Blowfish——Deprecated
Hashing & KDF

This is the start of the file. Read the full SKILL.md on GitHub.

Security

  • Security scanPassed, 95 of 100Pattern checks on the skill's files.
  • Model reviewPassed

Quality evaluation

  • Task evaluationNot runNo evaluation yet. Run one in Skill Studio.

Source

Popularity

Repository stars
80
Repository forks
14
7-day trend score
22

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