synaptiai/agent-capability-standard/critique

issues:
  - id: string  # Unique finding identifier
    type: failure_mode | edge_case | ambiguity | exploit | gap
    description: string  # Clear description of the issue
    severity: low | medium | high | critical
    location: string  # Where in target (file:line, section, etc.)
    evidence: string  # Supporting evidence
    reproduction: string | null  # How to reproduce
    recommendation: string  # Suggested fix
severity:  # Issue severities, keyed by issue id
  <issue_id>: low | medium | high | critical
risk_summary:
  overall_risk: low | medium | high | critical
  mitigations_possible: boolean
  urgent_issues: array[string]  # Issue IDs requiring immediate attention
  risk_distribution:
    critical: integer
    high: integer
    medium: integer
    low: integer
suggestions:
  - issue_ref: string  # Issue ID
    suggestion: string  # Detailed fix suggestion
    effort: low | medium | high
    priority: integer  # 1 = highest priority
patterns_identified:
  - pattern: string  # Recurring issue pattern
    affected_issues: array[string]
    systemic_fix: string  # How to address pattern
confidence: number  # 0.0-1.0
evidence_anchors: ["file:line", "section:name"]
assumptions: []

target:
  id: "deploy-plan-001"
  goal: "Deploy new authentication service"
  steps:
    - id: "step-1"
      action: "Stop old auth service"
    - id: "step-2"
      action: "Deploy new auth service"
    - id: "step-3"
      action: "Run smoke tests"
criteria: ["availability", "rollback", "security"]

issues:
  - id: "CRT-001"
    type: failure_mode
    description: "Zero-downtime deployment not guaranteed. Stopping old service before new is verified creates outage window."
    severity: high
    location: "step-1 to step-2 transition"
    evidence: "step-1 stops service, step-2 starts new - gap exists"
    reproduction: "Execute plan; observe 503 errors between steps"
    recommendation: "Use blue-green deployment: start new service, verify health, then route traffic"
  - id: "CRT-002"
    type: gap
    description: "No rollback step defined. If step-3 smoke tests fail, no recovery procedure."
    severity: critical
    location: "plan.steps - missing rollback"
    evidence: "No rollback_action in any step"
    reproduction: "Smoke tests fail; manual intervention required"
    recommendation: "Add rollback step: 'If step-3 fails, restart old auth service'"
  - id: "CRT-003"
    type: ambiguity
    description: "'Smoke tests' not defined. Unclear what is being tested or pass criteria."
    severity: medium
    location: "step-3"
    evidence: "No verification_criteria specified"
    reproduction: null
    recommendation: "Define specific test cases: auth flow, token validation, error handling"
  - id: "CRT-004"
    type: exploit
    description: "No security verification step. New service could have misconfigured permissions."
    severity: high
    location: "plan - missing security check"
    evidence: "No step validates auth service security posture"
    reproduction: "Deploy service with open admin endpoint; not caught by smoke tests"
    recommendation: "Add security scan step before traffic routing"
severity:
  CRT-001: high
  CRT-002: critical
  CRT-003: medium
  CRT-004: high
risk_summary:
  overall_risk: critical
  mitigations_possible: true
  urgent_issues: ["CRT-002", "CRT-001"]
  risk_distribution:
    critical: 1
    high: 2
    medium: 1
    low: 0
suggestions:
  - issue_ref: "CRT-002"
    suggestion: "Add rollback step with automatic trigger on smoke test failure"
    effort: low
    priority: 1
  - issue_ref: "CRT-001"
    suggestion: "Rewrite as blue-green deployment with health check before cutover"
    effort: medium
    priority: 2
  - issue_ref: "CRT-004"
    suggestion: "Add security scan after deployment, before enabling traffic"
    effort: medium
    priority: 3
  - issue_ref: "CRT-003"
    suggestion: "Define smoke test checklist with pass/fail criteria"
    effort: low
    priority: 4
patterns_identified:
  - pattern: "Missing safety gates"
    affected_issues: ["CRT-001", "CRT-002", "CRT-004"]
    systemic_fix: "Adopt CAVR pattern: checkpoint before each mutation, verify after each step"
confidence: 0.9
evidence_anchors:
  - "plan:step-1:stops-service"
  - "plan:steps:no-rollback"
assumptions:
  - "Auth service is critical for all user operations"
  - "Downtime of auth service blocks all authenticated requests"

target:
  file: "src/api/auth.py"
  code: |
    def login(username, password):
        user = db.query(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='{username}'")
        if user and user.password == password:
            return create_token(user.id)
        return None
criteria: ["security"]

issues:
  - id: "CRT-001"
    type: exploit
    description: "SQL injection vulnerability. Username is interpolated directly into query string."
    severity: critical
    location: "auth.py:2"
    evidence: "f-string query with unescaped username input"
    reproduction: "username=\"admin'--\", password=\"anything\" bypasses auth"
    recommendation: "Use parameterized query: db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?', (username,))"
  - id: "CRT-002"
    type: exploit
    description: "Plain-text password comparison. Passwords stored in cleartext or compared unsafely."
    severity: critical
    location: "auth.py:3"
    evidence: "Direct comparison: user.password == password"
    reproduction: "Database compromise exposes all passwords"
    recommendation: "Use bcrypt or argon2: bcrypt.checkpw(password, user.password_hash)"
  - id: "CRT-003"
    type: failure_mode
    description: "No rate limiting. Brute force attacks possible."
    severity: high
    location: "auth.py:login function"
    evidence: "No attempt tracking or delay mechanism"
    reproduction: "Script 1000 login attempts per second"
    recommendation: "Add rate limiting: max 5 attempts per minute per IP/username"
  - id: "CRT-004"
    type: edge_case
    description: "Empty username/password not handled. Could cause unexpected behavior."
    severity: low
    location: "auth.py:1"
    evidence: "No input validation at function entry"
    reproduction: "login('', '') - behavior undefined"
    recommendation: "Add input validation: if not username or not password: return None"
severity:
  CRT-001: critical
  CRT-002: critical
  CRT-003: high
  CRT-004: low
risk_summary:
  overall_risk: critical
  mitigations_possible: true
  urgent_issues: ["CRT-001", "CRT-002"]
  risk_distribution:
    critical: 2
    high: 1
    medium: 0
    low: 1
suggestions:
  - issue_ref: "CRT-001"
    suggestion: "IMMEDIATE: Replace f-string query with parameterized query"
    effort: low
    priority: 1
  - issue_ref: "CRT-002"
    suggestion: "IMMEDIATE: Migrate to bcrypt password hashing"
    effort: medium
    priority: 2
  - issue_ref: "CRT-003"
    suggestion: "Add rate limiting middleware before login endpoint"
    effort: medium
    priority: 3
  - issue_ref: "CRT-004"
    suggestion: "Add input validation decorator"
    effort: low
    priority: 4
patterns_identified:
  - pattern: "OWASP Top 10 violations"
    affected_issues: ["CRT-001", "CRT-002"]
    systemic_fix: "Security code review and SAST integration in CI"
confidence: 0.95
evidence_anchors:
  - "auth.py:2:sql-injection"
  - "auth.py:3:plaintext-password"
assumptions:
  - "This code handles real user authentication"
  - "Database contains actual user credentials"