ZERO TRUST PRINCIPLES:
- Never trust, always verify
- Assume breach
- Verify explicitly
- Least privilege access
- Micro-segmentation
 
ZERO TRUST COMPONENTS:
 
IDENTITY:
- Strong authentication (MFA)
- Identity governance
- Privileged access management
- Continuous validation
 
DEVICES:
- Device health verification
- Endpoint detection and response
- Mobile device management
- Asset inventory
 
NETWORK:
- Micro-segmentation
- Software-defined perimeter
- Encrypted communications
- Network access control
 
APPLICATIONS:
- Application-level authentication
- API security
- Web application firewall
- Secure coding practices
 
DATA:
- Data classification
- Encryption at rest and in transit
- Data loss prevention
- Access controls

SECURITY LAYERS:
 
PHYSICAL:
- Data center security
- Badge access
- Surveillance
- Environmental controls
 
PERIMETER:
- Firewalls
- IDS/IPS
- DMZ
- VPN
 
NETWORK:
- Segmentation
- Encryption
- Network monitoring
- NAC
 
HOST:
- Endpoint protection
- Host-based firewall
- Hardening
- Patch management
 
APPLICATION:
- WAF
- Secure coding
- Input validation
- Authentication
 
DATA:
- Encryption
- DLP
- Access controls
- Backup/recovery

LIFECYCLE:
 
1. DISCOVERY
   - Asset inventory
   - Vulnerability scanning
   - Penetration testing
   - Code analysis
 
2. PRIORITIZATION
   - CVSS scoring
   - Asset criticality
   - Exploit availability
   - Business context
 
3. REMEDIATION
   - Patch management
   - Configuration changes
   - Compensating controls
   - Risk acceptance
 
4. VERIFICATION
   - Rescan
   - Validation testing
   - Documentation
   - Reporting
 
5. REPORTING
   - Executive dashboards
   - Trend analysis
   - Compliance reporting
   - SLA tracking

PATCH PROCESS:
 
1. IDENTIFICATION
   - Vendor announcements
   - Vulnerability feeds
   - Security bulletins
 
2. ASSESSMENT
   - Applicability
   - Risk evaluation
   - Test requirements
 
3. TESTING
   - Lab validation
   - Compatibility testing
   - Rollback planning
 
4. DEPLOYMENT
   - Pilot group
   - Phased rollout
   - Monitoring
 
5. VERIFICATION
   - Confirm installation
   - Functional testing
   - Documentation

IAM COMPONENTS:
 
IDENTITY LIFECYCLE:
- Provisioning
- Modification
- De-provisioning
- Certification
 
AUTHENTICATION:
- Password policies
- Multi-factor authentication
- Single sign-on
- Passwordless
 
AUTHORIZATION:
- Role-based access (RBAC)
- Attribute-based access (ABAC)
- Least privilege
- Separation of duties
 
GOVERNANCE:
- Access reviews
- Policy enforcement
- Audit logging
- Compliance reporting

PAM CONTROLS:
 
VAULT:
- Credential storage
- Password rotation
- Secrets management
 
SESSION:
- Session recording
- Just-in-time access
- Time-limited credentials
 
MONITORING:
- Activity logging
- Behavioral analytics
- Alert on anomalies
 
GOVERNANCE:
- Access certification
- Policy enforcement
- Compliance reporting

SIMULATION PROGRAM:
 
FREQUENCY: Monthly
 
DIFFICULTY LEVELS:
- Easy: Generic, obvious errors
- Medium: Branded, some personalization
- Hard: Targeted, well-crafted
 
METRICS:
- Click rate
- Report rate
- Training completion
- Trend over time
 
RESPONSE:
- Click → Immediate training
- Report → Positive reinforcement
- Repeat offenders → Additional training

EXECUTIVE DASHBOARD:
 
RISK POSTURE:
- Overall risk score
- Risk trend
- Top risks
 
COMPLIANCE:
- Framework coverage
- Audit findings
- Remediation status
 
OPERATIONS:
- Incident summary
- Vulnerability status
- Patching compliance
 
INVESTMENT:
- Budget utilization
- Tool effectiveness
- Headcount

# WRONG - No authorization check
@app.get("/api/users/{user_id}/data")
async def get_user_data(user_id: str):
    return db.get_user_data(user_id)  # Any user can access any data
# RIGHT - Verify ownership
@app.get("/api/users/{user_id}/data")
async def get_user_data(user_id: str, current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user)):
    if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
    return db.get_user_data(user_id)

# WRONG - Weak hashing
import hashlib
password_hash = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
# RIGHT - Use bcrypt or argon2
from passlib.context import CryptContext
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
password_hash = pwd_context.hash(password)
verified = pwd_context.verify(password, password_hash)

# WRONG - SQL injection via string formatting
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '{email}'"
cursor.execute(query)
# RIGHT - Parameterized queries
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = %s", (email,))
# WRONG - Command injection via unsanitized input
# Never pass user input to shell commands directly
# Always use subprocess with list arguments:
# RIGHT - Safe subprocess usage
import subprocess
subprocess.run(["convert", user_filename, "output.png"], check=True)

# WRONG - No rate limiting on password reset
@app.post("/api/reset-password")
async def reset_password(email: str):
    send_reset_email(email)
# RIGHT - Rate limit + CAPTCHA
@app.post("/api/reset-password")
@limiter.limit("3/hour")
async def reset_password(email: str, captcha: str):
    if not verify_captcha(captcha):
        raise HTTPException(400, "Invalid CAPTCHA")
    send_reset_email(email)

# WRONG - Debug mode in production, exposing stack traces
# RIGHT - Environment-aware configuration
app = FastAPI(debug=os.getenv("ENV") == "development")
@app.exception_handler(Exception)
async def handle_error(request, exc):
    logger.error(f"Unhandled error: {exc}", exc_info=True)
    return JSONResponse(status_code=500, content={"error": "Internal server error"})

# Audit dependencies regularly
npm audit
pip audit
cargo audit
# Pin versions, use lockfiles (package-lock.json, Pipfile.lock, Cargo.lock)

// WRONG - JWT with no expiration, weak secret
const token = jwt.sign(payload, "secret123");
// RIGHT - Short expiry, strong secret, refresh tokens
const token = jwt.sign(payload, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
  expiresIn: "15m",
  algorithm: "RS256",
  issuer: "my-app",
});

# Pin action versions in GitHub Actions (not @main)
- uses: actions/checkout@v4.1.1

# Log security-relevant events with structured data
logger.info("auth.login.success", extra={"user_id": user.id, "ip": request.client.host})
logger.warning("auth.login.failed", extra={"email": email, "ip": request.client.host})
logger.critical("auth.bruteforce.detected", extra={"ip": request.client.host, "attempts": count})

# WRONG - User controls URL without validation
# RIGHT - Allowlist domains, block internal IPs
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"api.example.com", "cdn.example.com"}
def safe_fetch(url: str) -> Response:
    parsed = urlparse(url)
    if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
        raise ValueError("Host not allowed")
    ip = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(parsed.hostname))
    if ip.is_private:
        raise ValueError("Internal addresses not allowed")
    return requests.get(url, timeout=10)

# Semgrep (recommended - fast, customizable)
semgrep scan --config auto .
semgrep scan --config p/owasp-top-ten .
semgrep scan --config p/secrets .

# OWASP ZAP baseline scan (passive, fast)
docker run -t ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable zap-baseline.py \
  -t https://your-app.com
 
# Full scan (active, thorough)
docker run -t ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable zap-full-scan.py \
  -t https://your-app.com
 
# API scan
docker run -t ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable zap-api-scan.py \
  -t https://your-app.com/openapi.json -f openapi

# Sign container images with cosign
cosign sign --key cosign.key docker.io/myapp:latest
 
# Verify signatures
cosign verify --key cosign.pub docker.io/myapp:latest

# Lock dependencies and audit regularly
npm ci                    # Install from lockfile only
npm audit --audit-level=high
pip-audit
cargo audit
# Use Dependabot or Renovate for automated updates