0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/defi-security
Claude Code and agent skill by 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit
Trust tier 2
- community
Source check pending
Checking that the SKILL.md file is still in the repository.
[AUTO-INVOKE] MUST be invoked BEFORE deploying DeFi contracts (DEX, lending, staking, LP, token). Covers anti-whale, anti-MEV, flash loan protection, launch checklists, and emergency response. Trigger: any deployment or security review of DeFi-related contracts.
Install
npx vskill@latest install 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/defi-securitySKILL.md
The same SKILL.md was published earlier as 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/defi-security.
DeFi Security Principles
Language Rule
- Always respond in the same language the user is using. If the user asks in Chinese, respond in Chinese. If in English, respond in English.
Scope: Only applicable to DeFi projects (DEX, lending, staking, LP, yield). Non-DeFi projects can ignore this skill.
Protection Decision Rules
| Threat | Required Protection | |
|---|---|---|
| Whale manipulation | Daily transaction caps + per-tx amount limits + cooldown window | |
| MEV / sandwich attack | EOA-only checks (msg.sender == tx.origin), or use commit-reveal pattern | |
| Arbitrage | Referral binding + liquidity distribution + fixed yield model + lock period | |
| Reentrancy | ReentrancyGuard on all external-call functions (see solidity-security skill) | |
| Flash loan attack | Check block.number change between operations, or use TWAP pricing | |
| Price manipulation | Chainlink oracle or TWAP — never rely on spot AMM reserves for pricing | |
| Approval exploit | Use safeIncreaseAllowance / safeDecreaseAllowance, never raw approve for user flows | |
| Governance attack | Voting requires snapshot + minimum token holding period; timelock ≥ 48h on proposal execution | |
| ERC4626 inflation attack | First deposit must enforce minimum amount or use virtual shares to prevent share dilution via rounding | |
| Cross-vault trust bypass | Router/Registry relay must verify vault authorization; never trust caller identity inside flash loan callbacks — EVMbench/noya H-08 | |
| Collateral ownership exploit | Liquidation/staking operations must verify actual NFT/collateral ownership — EVMbench/benddao | |
| Bonding curve manipulation | ID/pricing params in create operations must be fully determined before external calls — EVMbench/phi H-06 | |
DEX pair _transfer TOCTOU | Never distinguish operation type by balance/reserve checks in _transfer — both directions are exploitable: buy vs removeLiquidity (pair→user) and sell vs addLiquidity (user→pair); use address whitelist only; new projects prefer Uniswap V4 Hook | |
| Per-address state bypass | Any mapping(address => ...) restriction (cooldown, max tx, max balance) can be bypassed via multi-address or transfer-then-trade; propagate restriction state on wallet-to-wallet transfers using max(_lastTxTime[to], _lastTxTime[from]) — never block.timestamp (griefing) or direct assignment (overwrite shortening) |
Anti-Whale Implementation Rules
- Maximum single transaction amount: configurable via
onlyOwnersetter - Daily cumulative limit per address: track with
mapping(address => mapping(uint256 => uint256))(address → day → amount) - Cooldown between transactions: enforce minimum time gap with
block.timestampcheck - Whitelist for exempt addresses (deployer, LP pair, staking contract)
Flash Loan Protection Rules
- For price-sensitive operations: require that
block.numberhas changed since last interaction - For oracle-dependent calculations: use time-weighted average (TWAP) over minimum 30 minutes
- For critical state changes: add minimum holding period before action (e.g., must hold tokens for N blocks)
Protocol Composability Risks
Source: EVMbench (OpenAI/Paradigm, Feb 2026) — vulnerability patterns from Code4rena audits
- Cross-vault operations [noya H-08]: Registry/Router relay calls must verify vault-level authorization; prevent keeper from using flash loan to impersonate other vaults
- Lending collateral [benddao]: Liquidation functions must verify
msg.senderactually owns or is authorized to operate on target collateral - Bonding curve [phi H-06]: In create + auto-buy operations, ID assignment and pricing params must be fully determined before the buy transaction executes; prevent reentrancy from modifying them
- Shared registries [noya H-08]: Permission propagation chains in shared registries must be verified hop-by-hop; never rely solely on "trusted sender" flags
Launch Checklist
Before mainnet deployment, verify all items:
- [ ] All
onlyOwnerfunctions transferred to multisig wallet - [ ] Timelock contract deployed and configured (minimum 24h delay for critical changes)
- [ ] Emergency pause mechanism tested — both pause and unpause functions work correctly
- [ ] Daily limit parameters documented and set to reasonable values
- [ ] Third-party security audit completed and all critical/high findings resolved
- [ ] Testnet deployment running for minimum 7 days with no issues
- [ ] Slippage, fee, and lock period parameters reviewed and documented
- [ ] Initial liquidity plan documented (amount, lock duration, LP token handling)
- [ ] Fuzz testing passes with high iterations (10000+) on all DeFi-critical functions
Emergency Response Procedure
| Step | Action | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Detect | Monitor alerts trigger (on-chain monitoring, community reports) | |
| 2. Pause | Designated address calls pause() — must respond within minutes | |
| 3. Assess | Technical lead analyzes root cause, estimates fund impact | |
| 4. Communicate | Post incident notice to community channels (Discord, Twitter, Telegram) | |
| 5. Fix | Deploy fix or prepare recovery plan | |
| 6. Resume | Call unpause() after fix verified on fork — or migrate to new contract | |
| 7. Post-mortem | Publish detailed incident report within 48 hours |
DeFi Testing Reference
| Test Scenario | Approach | |
|---|---|---|
| Fuzz test fund flows | Run fuzz tests on staking/pool contracts with high iterations (10000+) | |
| Fork mainnet testing | Use Foundry fork mode against mainnet RPC to test with real state | |
| Simulate whale transaction | Use Foundry cast CLI to simulate large-amount calls on a forked network |
Security
- Security scanPassed, 100 of 100Pattern checks on the skill's files.
- Model reviewNot runA model review is scheduled for the next rescan.
Quality evaluation
- Task evaluationFailed, 75 of 100Degrading. 1 run. Evaluated 8 months ago.
Source
- SKILL.md in the repositoryCheckingskills/defi-security/SKILL.md
Popularity
- Repository stars
- 4
- Repository forks
- 1
- 7-day trend score
- 5
Stars and forks are for the whole GitHub repository, not this skill alone. Refreshed 11 May 2026, 6 months ago.
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