kienbui1995/magic-powers/ado-pipeline-security

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Use when hardening Azure Pipelines security — YAML pipeline permissions, fork build security, resource authorization, secret scanning, protected resources, and preventing pipeline-based attacks.

Install

npx vskill@latest install kienbui1995/magic-powers/ado-pipeline-security

SKILL.md

The same SKILL.md was published earlier as kienbui1995/magic-powers/ado-pipeline-security.

ADO Pipeline Security

When to Use

  • Reviewing pipeline security before production use
  • Hardening pipelines against secret exfiltration
  • Configuring fork PR build security for open source repos
  • Auditing which pipelines can access service connections
  • Implementing least-privilege pipeline permissions
  • Responding to a pipeline security incident or audit finding

Core Jobs

1. Secret Management in Pipelines
yaml
# WRONG — secret visible in logs even with masking in some scenarios
- script: echo "Password is $(DB_PASSWORD)"
# WRONG — secret visible in process list on the agent
- script: myapp --connection-string "$(ConnectionString)"
# CORRECT — pass as environment variable (masked in logs, not in process list)
- script: dotnet ef database update
env:
ConnectionStrings__Default: $(ConnectionString) # masked in logs
# CORRECT — use az keyvault to fetch at runtime (never stored in pipeline)
- task: AzureKeyVault@2
inputs:
azureSubscription: Azure-ServiceConnection
KeyVaultName: myapp-keyvault
SecretsFilter: 'db-password,api-key'
RunAsPreJob: true # fetch before all jobs in the stage

Secret hygiene rules:

  • Secrets from Key Vault-linked variable groups are auto-masked in logs
  • Never pass secrets as command-line arguments (visible in ps aux on agent)
  • Use environment variables to inject secrets into processes
  • Enable "Audit" on secret variable groups to track access in the audit log
  • Mark variables as secret in the pipeline UI — they cannot be printed even accidentally
2. Fork Build Security
yaml
# For public repos — fork PRs can modify pipeline YAML (attacker-controlled)
# Restrict via Organization Settings → Pipelines → Settings:
# "Limit variables that can be set at queue time": enabled
# "Protect access to repositories in YAML pipelines": enabled
# "Disable creating classic build pipelines": enabled (YAML only, auditable)
# PR trigger with fork safety
pr:
autoCancel: true # cancel old PR builds when new commit pushed (no resource waste)
branches:
include: [main]

Fork PR security settings (Project Settings → Pipelines → Settings):

  • "Comment required before running pipeline for outside contributors" — manual maintainer review before fork PR pipeline runs; prevents malicious pipelines from auto-executing
  • Limit secrets to forks — forks cannot access service connections or variable group secrets (enforced by default, do not disable)
  • "No access" for fork contributions to sensitive variable groups — verify in Library → variable group → Pipeline permissions
3. Resource Authorization (Least-Privilege Service Connections)
yaml
# Reference service connection in pipeline — ADO prompts for authorization on first run
# This is the expected security flow — do not skip by granting "all pipelines"
steps:
- task: AzureWebApp@1
inputs:
azureSubscription: Azure-Production-ServiceConnection # authorized pipeline-by-pipeline
appName: myapp-prod

Restrict service connection access (Azure DevOps UI):

Project Settings → Service connections → [connection name] → Security
→ Remove "Allow access to all pipelines"
→ Add only specific pipelines that legitimately need this connection

Service connection best practices:

  • Use service principal with minimum required RBAC role (e.g. Contributor on one resource group, not subscription)
  • Rotate service principal credentials on a schedule (or use federated credentials — no secret to rotate)
  • Never use personal account credentials in service connections (leaves when employee departs)
  • Production service connections: authorize only 1-2 specific release pipelines, never "all pipelines"
4. YAML Pipeline Isolation
yaml
# Container jobs — isolate pipeline job from agent host
jobs:
- job: Build
pool:
vmImage: ubuntu-latest
container: mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0 # runs in container, isolated from host
steps:
- script: dotnet build
# Deploy job — don't check out source code (not needed, reduces attack surface)
- stage: Deploy
jobs:
- deployment: DeployProd
environment: production
strategy:
runOnce:
deploy:
steps:
- checkout: none # explicitly skip source checkout
- download: current
artifact: drop
- task: AzureWebApp@1
5. Pipeline YAML Security Review
yaml
# Red flags to look for in pipeline YAML review:
# 1. Inline scripts with sensitive operations (check for hardcoded values)
- script: |
export API_KEY=abc123 # WRONG — hardcoded secret
# 2. Overly permissive chmod
- script: chmod -R 777 /app # WRONG — unnecessary broad permissions
# 3. curl | bash patterns (supply chain risk)
- script: curl https://example.com/install.sh | bash # WRONG — unverified code execution
# 4. Publishing artifacts that may contain secrets
- task: PublishPipelineArtifact@1
inputs:
targetPath: $(Build.SourcesDirectory) # WRONG — may include .env files
artifactName: source # publish only the built output, not source
# CORRECT — publish only the build output directory
- task: PublishPipelineArtifact@1
inputs:
targetPath: $(Build.ArtifactStagingDirectory)
artifactName: drop
6. Audit & Compliance Checks
bash
# List all service connections in project
az devops service-endpoint list \
--project MyProject \
--org https://dev.azure.com/MyOrg \
--output table
# List all pipelines (to review which have access to sensitive connections)
az pipelines list \
--project MyProject \
--org https://dev.azure.com/MyOrg \
--output table
# Show pipeline YAML for review
az pipelines show \
--id 5 \
--project MyProject \
--org https://dev.azure.com/MyOrg
# Review audit log for service connection usage
az devops audit query \
--org https://dev.azure.com/MyOrg \
--start-time "2024-01-01T00:00:00" \
--output table

Key Concepts

  • Secret masking — Azure DevOps automatically replaces secret variable values with *** in pipeline logs; only works if variable is marked secret
  • Fork security — contributors on forked repos can modify pipeline YAML; the fork pipeline runs with access to the fork's YAML, treat as untrusted code
  • Resource authorization — a pipeline must be explicitly authorized to use service connections, agent pools, variable groups, and environments; first use triggers authorization prompt
  • Container jobs — run pipeline job inside a Docker container for filesystem isolation from the host agent
  • Protected resources — service connections, agent pools, variable groups, secure files, and environments with access controls configured
  • Federated credentials — service principal authentication without a client secret; uses OIDC token from Azure DevOps (no credential to rotate or leak)

Checklist

  • [ ] No secrets hardcoded in pipeline YAML variables (use Key Vault-linked variable groups)?
  • [ ] Secrets passed as environment variables to processes (not command-line arguments)?
  • [ ] Fork PR builds require maintainer comment approval before running?
  • [ ] Production service connections restricted to specific named pipelines (not "all pipelines")?
  • [ ] Pipeline YAML stored in repo and version-controlled (auditable history)?
  • [ ] checkout: none in deploy jobs (source code not needed at deploy time)?
  • [ ] Service connections use service principal (not personal account or admin credentials)?
  • [ ] No curl | bash patterns in pipeline scripts (supply chain risk)?

Key Outputs

  • Pipeline security review report covering secrets, permissions, fork settings, and resource authorization
  • Production service connections restricted to authorized pipelines only
  • Fork PR security configured to require maintainer approval before pipeline execution
  • Container jobs implemented for build isolation where agent trust is a concern

Output Format

  • 🔴 Critical — secrets hardcoded in YAML or echoed to logs, production service connections accessible to all pipelines, fork PRs running without maintainer approval on public repos
  • 🟡 Warning — service connections using personal account PATs instead of service principal, no periodic review of pipeline resource authorization, curl | bash patterns in scripts
  • 🟢 Suggestion — use container jobs for build isolation, implement federated credentials to eliminate secret rotation, audit pipeline permissions on a quarterly schedule

Anti-Patterns

  • echo $(SECRET_VARIABLE) in scripts — even with masking, some debug log modes can reveal values
  • "Allow all pipelines" on production service connections — any new pipeline immediately gets production access
  • Classic build pipelines for new work — not version-controlled, not reviewable via PR, harder to audit
  • Storing pipeline artifacts that include source code alongside build outputs (may contain sensitive config)
  • Using the same service connection for dev and production (blast radius of leaked credential includes production)

Integration

  • ado-pipeline-design — security principles applied to the pipeline structure designed there
  • ado-pipelines-ops — service connection setup with least-privilege RBAC roles
  • ado-security-policies — branch policies and organization security settings that complement pipeline security

Security

  • Security scanPassed, 95 of 100Pattern checks on the skill's files.
  • Model reviewPassed

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