Best practices
Modern web development standards based on Lighthouse best practices audits. Covers security, browser compatibility, and code quality patterns.
Security
HTTPS everywhere
Enforce HTTPS:
html
<!-- ❌ Mixed content -->
<img src="http://example.com/image.jpg">
<script src="http://cdn.example.com/script.js"></script>
<!-- ✅ HTTPS only -->
<img src="https://example.com/image.jpg">
<script src="https://cdn.example.com/script.js"></script>
Avoid protocol-relative URLs (//example.com/...) — they're an HTTP-era pattern with no benefit on HTTPS-only sites and hide the actual scheme from reviewers.
HSTS Header:
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
Content Security Policy (CSP)
html
<!-- Basic CSP via meta tag -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https://trusted-cdn.com;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;">
<!-- Better: HTTP header -->
CSP Header (recommended):
Content-Security-Policy:
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'nonce-abc123' https://trusted.com;
style-src 'self' 'nonce-abc123';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
frame-ancestors 'self';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'self';
Using nonces for inline scripts:
html
<script nonce="abc123">
// This inline script is allowed
</script>
Trusted Types (modern DOM-XSS defense)
A strict CSP blocks loading untrusted script files, but it doesn't stop a string from reaching innerHTML, eval, or other DOM-XSS sinks. Trusted Types — Baseline across all major browsers since early 2026 — closes that hole by making sinks reject raw strings and accept only typed objects produced by a named policy.
Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default;
javascript
// One central policy that does the sanitization
const escape = trustedTypes.createPolicy('default', {
createHTML: (s) => DOMPurify.sanitize(s, { RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true })
});
// ❌ This now throws TypeError under enforcement
element.innerHTML = userInput;
// ✅ Goes through the policy
element.innerHTML = escape.createHTML(userInput);
Roll out with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only first to find every sink usage in your app, then flip to enforcement. Angular has built-in Trusted Types support; React 19+ produces TrustedHTML when Trusted Types are enforced; for everything else, DOMPurify is the de-facto sanitizer.
Subresource Integrity (SRI) for third-party scripts
Pin every <script> and <link rel="stylesheet"> you load from a CDN you don't control. If the CDN is compromised — as happened to polyfill.io in 2024 — the browser refuses to execute a file whose hash doesn't match.
html
<script src="https://cdn.example.com/lib@1.2.3/dist/lib.js"
integrity="sha384-oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlGYl1kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC"
crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
integrity accepts space-separated hashes; include the next version's hash before rotating to avoid downtime. Generate with openssl dgst -sha384 -binary file.js | openssl base64 -A. SRI requires crossorigin and an Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header from the CDN.
Security headers
# Prevent clickjacking — prefer CSP `frame-ancestors` (above); X-Frame-Options
# is the legacy fallback for older browsers.
X-Frame-Options: DENY
# Prevent MIME type sniffing
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
# Do NOT send X-XSS-Protection. The legacy browser XSS auditor was deprecated
# and removed (Chrome 78, Edge 17), and in some cases it introduced its own
# vulnerabilities. Use a strict CSP + Trusted Types (below) instead.
# Control referrer information
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
# Permissions policy (formerly Feature-Policy)
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()
No vulnerable libraries
bash
# Check for vulnerabilities
npm audit
yarn audit
# Auto-fix when possible
npm audit fix
# Check specific package
npm ls lodash
Keep dependencies updated:
json
// package.json
{
"scripts": {
"audit": "npm audit --audit-level=moderate",
"update": "npm update && npm audit fix"
}
}
Known vulnerable patterns to avoid:
javascript
// ❌ Recursive merges of untrusted input can pollute Object.prototype
// via __proto__, constructor, or prototype keys.
_.merge(target, userInput); // lodash <4.17.20
$.extend(true, {}, target, userInput); // jQuery deep extend
Object.assign(target, ...userInputs); // safe by itself (shallow), but unsafe
// when target IS Object.prototype-derived
// and userInput contains __proto__
// ✅ For untrusted bags, use a null-prototype object so __proto__ is just a key
const safe = Object.create(null);
Object.assign(safe, userInput); // shallow, no recursion → safe by construction
// ✅ For deep copies, structuredClone drops __proto__ and functions
const deepSafe = structuredClone(userInput);
// ✅ For deep merges, use a library that explicitly blocks dangerous keys
// (e.g. lodash ≥4.17.21 _.mergeWith with a customizer, or deepmerge-ts).
Input sanitization
javascript
// ❌ XSS vulnerable
element.innerHTML = userInput;
document.write(userInput);
// ✅ Safe text content
element.textContent = userInput;
// ✅ If HTML needed, sanitize
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
element.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
Secure cookies
javascript
// ❌ Insecure cookie
document.cookie = "session=abc123";
// ✅ Secure cookie (server-side)
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/
Browser compatibility
Doctype declaration
html
<!-- ❌ Missing or invalid doctype -->
<HTML>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN">
<!-- ✅ HTML5 doctype -->
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
Character encoding
html
<!-- ❌ Missing or late charset -->
<html>
<head>
<title>Page</title>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
</head>
<!-- ✅ Charset as first element in head -->
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>Page</title>
</head>
Viewport meta tag
html
<!-- ❌ Missing viewport -->
<head>
<title>Page</title>
</head>
<!-- ✅ Responsive viewport -->
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>Page</title>
</head>
Feature detection
javascript
// ❌ Browser detection (brittle)
if (navigator.userAgent.includes('Chrome')) {
// Chrome-specific code
}
// ✅ Feature detection
if ('IntersectionObserver' in window) {
// Use IntersectionObserver
} else {
// Fallback
}
// ✅ Using @supports in CSS
@supports (display: grid) {
.container {
display: grid;
}
}
@supports not (display: grid) {
.container {
display: flex;
}
}
Polyfills (when needed)
Prefer bundling polyfills at build time (Babel/SWC + core-js, or @vitejs/plugin-legacy) targeted by your supported-browsers list. This eliminates the runtime check entirely and avoids shipping polyfill bytes to modern browsers.
If you must load a polyfill at runtime, append a script element — never use document.write (it blocks the parser and is broken in async/deferred contexts):
html
<script>
if (!('fetch' in window)) {
const s = document.createElement('script');
s.src = '/polyfills/fetch.js';
s.defer = true;
document.head.appendChild(s);
}
</script>
Never load polyfills from a third-party CDN you don't control. The polyfill.io service was compromised in mid-2024 in a supply-chain attack and used to serve malware to ~100k sites. Self-host, or use a vetted mirror (e.g. Cloudflare's `cdnjs` polyfill build) — and pin the version with Subresource Integrity.
Deprecated APIs
Avoid these
javascript
// ❌ document.write (blocks parsing)
document.write('<script src="..."></script>');
// ✅ Dynamic script loading
const script = document.createElement('script');
script.src = '...';
document.head.appendChild(script);
// ❌ Synchronous XHR (blocks main thread)
const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('GET', url, false); // false = synchronous
// ✅ Async fetch
const response = await fetch(url);
// ❌ Application Cache (deprecated)
<html manifest="cache.manifest">
// ✅ Service Workers
if ('serviceWorker' in navigator) {
navigator.serviceWorker.register('/sw.js');
}
Event listener passive
javascript
// ❌ Non-passive touch/wheel (may block scrolling)
element.addEventListener('touchstart', handler);
element.addEventListener('wheel', handler);
// ✅ Passive listeners (allows smooth scrolling)
element.addEventListener('touchstart', handler, { passive: true });
element.addEventListener('wheel', handler, { passive: true });
// ✅ If you need preventDefault, be explicit
element.addEventListener('touchstart', handler, { passive: false });
Console & errors
No console errors
javascript
// ❌ Errors in production
console.log('Debug info'); // Remove in production
throw new Error('Unhandled'); // Catch all errors
// ✅ Proper error handling
try {
riskyOperation();
} catch (error) {
// Log to error tracking service
errorTracker.captureException(error);
// Show user-friendly message
showErrorMessage('Something went wrong. Please try again.');
}
Error boundaries (React)
jsx
class ErrorBoundary extends React.Component {
state = { hasError: false };
static getDerivedStateFromError(error) {
return { hasError: true };
}
componentDidCatch(error, info) {
errorTracker.captureException(error, { extra: info });
}
render() {
if (this.state.hasError) {
return <FallbackUI />;
}
return this.props.children;
}
}
// Usage
<ErrorBoundary>
<App />
</ErrorBoundary>
Global error handler
javascript
// Catch unhandled errors
window.addEventListener('error', (event) => {
errorTracker.captureException(event.error);
});
// Catch unhandled promise rejections
window.addEventListener('unhandledrejection', (event) => {
errorTracker.captureException(event.reason);
});
Source maps
Production configuration
javascript
// ❌ Source maps exposed in production
// webpack.config.js
module.exports = {
devtool: 'source-map', // Exposes source code
};
// ✅ Hidden source maps (uploaded to error tracker)
module.exports = {
devtool: 'hidden-source-map',
};
// ✅ Or no source maps in production
module.exports = {
devtool: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? false : 'source-map',
};
Strip `sourcesContent` from production maps when uploading to your error tracker. By default, bundlers embed the full original source inside the .map file — anyone who obtains the map (including via a misconfigured upload step) gets your unminified code. Configure your bundler to omit sourcesContent, or use a Sentry/Bugsnag CLI flag that does so when uploading.
For Vite, prefer sourcemap: 'hidden' over 'true' so the //# sourceMappingURL= comment isn't emitted into the bundle.
Performance best practices
Avoid blocking patterns
javascript
// ❌ Blocking script
<script src="heavy-library.js"></script>
// ✅ Deferred script
<script defer src="heavy-library.js"></script>
// ❌ Blocking CSS import
@import url('other-styles.css');